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An evaluation of the costs and benefits of the Foreign
Military Sales (FMS) program is presented. Focusing on
economic, military, and political factors, a comparative
analysis reveals that the FMS program is beneficial to the
United States at this time. However, if program controls
are not improved the FMS program could become detrimental
to national security. The recommended approach to improved
program controls is more involvement of the State Department
in DOD's Security Assistance Planning, Programming, and
Budgeting System (PPBS) and better coordination and analysis
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Debate over the costs and benefits of international
arms sales, comparatively quiet since the 1930 's, has begun
again in the past few years with increasing heat and little
light.
The controversy began in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. Individuals, not governments, were
the principle arms sellers then. Sir Basil Zaharoff (the
super-salesman for Vickers of Britain) , Francis Bannerman
of the United States and others had amassed large fortunes
in private arms sales. Private arms sales were held at
least partially responsible for the carnage of World War I
and several smaller conflicts. "Merchants of Death" seemed
an all too appropriate epithet for such men. Two major
investigations — the U.S. Senate Munitions Inquiry (Nye
Committee) of 1934-36 and the Royal Commission on the Private
Manufacture and Trading of Arms of 1936 confirmed the worst
about private arms sales. "Both investigations found a
large number of unsavory practices: bribery, collusive
bidding, profiteering, violation of arms embargoes, illegal
financial transactions, production of poor quality equipment,
and even sales to the enemy."
George Thayer, The War Business . New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1969. p. 32.

Public indignation toward the "Merchants of Death" and
a belief that governments would be more responsible in the
arms sale business led to the Neutrality Acts of 1936,
1937 and 1939. These Acts provided arms export licensing
and control authority which lasted until 1950. The Mutual
Security Act of 1954 and the Foreign Assistance Act of 19 61
followed, with the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968
providing the authority for current arms sales.
In the Foreign Military Sales Act, as amended, the
Congress
:
(1) Declared the ultimate goal of the U.S.
to be a world free of the dangers and burdens
of armaments with the use of force subordinated
to the rule of law;
(2) Affirmed the increasing cost and com-
plexity of defense equipment and recognized
that there continues a need for international
defense cooperation to maintain peace and
security;
(3) Established that the United States will
facilitate the common defense by entering into
international arrangements with friendly coun-
tries on projects of cooperative exchange of
data, research, development, production, pro-
curement and logistics support to achieve
national defense requirements and objectives
of mutual concern;
(4) To this end, authorized sales to friendly
countries to equip their forces with due
regard to impact on social and economic
development and on arms races;
(5) Declared the sense of the Congress that
all such sales be approved only when they are
consistent with foreign policy interests of
the United States. 2
2Department of Defense Instruction 5105. 38M, Military
Assistance and Sales Manual . 1 May 1976. Part III,
Chapter B, paragraph 2. p. B-l.

The perceived benefits of arms sales (reasons the U.S.
desires to sell) , as listed in the Department of Defense
Military Assistance and Sales Manual, are:
* "Military exports sales support specific
foreign policy and security interests of
the United States. Such sales have in the
past improved internal order and increased
the prospects for regional stability,
thereby reducing the likelihood of direct
U.S. military involvement. Standardization
of materiel, doctrine, and training is
enhanced among our allies and friends. The
U.S. production base is maintained, U.S.
employment is increased, research and
development costs are reduced, and forward
materiel support is facilitated. The U.S.
balance of payments is aided and closer
relations, cooperation, and partnership
with other nations are engendered. "3
Additionally, nations desire to sell arms because such
sales may provide them influence with the recipient nation,




B. THE CURRENT SITUATION
Until recently, Europe and Asia were the major recipients
of U.S. arms- sales with more than seventy percent of U.S.
arms exports going to nations bordering the Soviet Union,
Warsaw Pact countries, and the Peoples Republic of China.
3 Ibid .
4
Michael T. Klare, "The Political Economy of Arms
Sales," The Bulletion of the Atomic Scientists . Vol. 32,
No. 9. November (23) 1976. pp. 6-F - 8-F.
10

The biggest customer, as shown by Tables I and II, is nofc^
the Middle East - Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. The
change in focus of American arms sales to an extremely
volatile area of the world has caused as much or more con-
cern in the U.S. as the seemingly uncontrolled growth of
arms sales throughout the world. Figures 1 and 2 depict
this change of focus and growth of arms sales. The concern
and the possible consequences for world peace make the arms
transfer programs and policies of the U.S. worthy of close
scrutiny and critical analysis.
In 19 52 world trade in non-nuclear weapons totaled about
$300 million. In 1974 arms trade totaled $18 billion, an
increase of 6,000 percent. There has also been a dramatic
increase in the technical sophistication of the weapons
transferred. No longer are they transfers of obsolete or
phased-out weapons, but the latest and best first-line items
of the transferring countries. The sale of the F-14 fighter
aircraft to Iran by the U.S. is an example of this.
Interarms, the biggest private arms company on earth,
has annual sales estimated at $40 million, but governments
5
sell billions worth of arms. Defense industries are becoming
more dependent on foreign sales of weapons. Fifty percent
of French aerospace output is exported, as is thirty percent
of British aerospace output. Ten manufacturers in the U.S.
"Nations Shall Sell Death Unto Nation," Punch . 26
February 1975. pp. 334-337.
11

sold a total of more than $2.3 billion in arms in 1975
(Table III)
.
The United States accounted for forty-six
percent of the arms transfers in the world in 1975 and the
Soviet Union for thirty percent. France and Britain were
battling it out for third place.
President Richard M. Nixon began pushing foreign sales
about five years ago without any announcement of a change
of policy or any public debate. This emphasis on foreign
sales was an outgrowth of the "Nixon Doctrine" announced in
Guam on 25 July 1969 and further defined in his State of the
Union message to Congress in January 1970. Nixon hoped that
advanced weaponry would be a useful bargaining chip in diplo-
matic negotiations. The weapons were to go to allies or
friends the U.S. wanted to influence.
In the spring and summer of 1973, while the nation's
attention was focused on the unraveling Watergate scandal,
the Administration announced a series of major decisions on
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) which indicated a radical shift
in U.S. policy toward the underdeveloped "third world."
On 26 May it was announced that the U.S. would sell advanced
armaments, including F-4 and F-5E aircraft to Kuwait and
Saudi Arabia — both of which had provided funds and military
support to Arab forces battling Israel. On 5 June, the
Secretary of State, William P. Rogers, announced that Nixon
would exercise the option under provisions of the FMS Act
to waive restrictions on sale of "sophisticated" hardware
12

to Latin American - F-5E to Argentina, Brazil, Colombia,
Venezuela, and Chile. At the end of July it was announced
that the Shah of Iran would come to the U.S. to select $2.5
billion worth of weapons.
These three decisions appeared to nullify policies in
effect since World War II. Previous administrations had
held that sales to third world countries should be carefully
screened to prevent needless expenditures on non-develop-
mental programs, and to prevent local arms races from
erupting into warfare.
One hundred members of Congress in a joint letter to
the Secretary of State in 197 5 said that "the intense compe-
tition between the U.S. and western European countries [in
arms sales] ... is clearly out of hand." The Senate Foreign
Relations Committee has warned that the military sales pro-
7gram is "out of control." Retired Rear Admiral Gene Larocque,
Head of the Center for Defense Information, has testified to
Congress that "the government is pursuing an uncontrolled,
unplanned, hectic effort to sell weapons all over the world
to any country that can afford the downpayment . " Jimmy
Carter, in a speech to the Foreign Policy Association in
June 197 6, asked, "Can we be both the world's leading champion
General Accounting Office, Foreign Military Sales —
A Growing Concern . Report ID-76-51. Washington, D.C.: GPO,
1 June 1976. p. 18.
7




of peace and the world's leading supplier of weapons of
war? We can not have it both ways." Carter further stated
in the second Presidential Candidates Debates in San Fran-
cisco on 7 October 1976 that, we should "become the bread-
basket of the world instead of the arms merchant of the
world ... I believe we can, and we ought to."
C. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE
What is our arms sales policy? What are the problems
that these sales are creating? Are the benefits of FMS
greater than the costs? What, if anything, could be or
should be done to better control or strengthen the FMS
program?
This study will examine the "costs" (arguments against
the foreign military sales program) and the "benefits"
(arguments for the program) with the purpose of attempting
to answer the questions listed above.
The thesis of this study is that the FMS program is
generally beneficial to the nation and has more benefits
than costs. Nevertheless, there are some serious problems
caused by a large arms sales program and improvements in
long-range planning are needed.
Chapter Two will discuss the "costs" of the FMS program
and Chapter Three will examine the "benefits." Having pre-
sented the major arguments on both sides of the question,
Chapter Four will provide the authors ' conclusion on the
14

value of the FMS program and indicate current problem areas
that need improvement. Chapter Five will present a new
approach for better coordination and analysis of FMS.
The research methodology for this thesis was a review
of current literature (studies, articles, theses, Congress-
ional hearings, government publications, and political
speeches) . The sources used in this thesis are acknowledged





Top Ten FMS Purchasers in 1975
Country Amount
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Projected FMS for 1976
Country Amount
Saudi Arabia $ 2 ,502,500,000
Iran $ 1 ,301,300,000
Israel $ 919,500,000




Federal Republic of Germany $ 194,200,000










United Kingdom $ 46,500,000
Pakistan $ 38,600,000
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II. THE COSTS OF FMS
The problems or "costs" of the foreign military sales
program are lightly dismissed by proponents or even wors,
in some cases, not even considered. An often cited "benefit"
of the FMS program is the influence factor. The influence
of one country over the policy of another through the supply
of arms is the ability to alter the policy of the recipient.
Typically the exercise of influence involves resolving
conflict between two states in ways that are consistent with
pthe preferences of the arms supplier. Selling arms allows
the U.S. to influence the internal policies of a country to
U.S. advantage or from U.S. point of view for the better,
say the proponents of FMS. History seems to show that this
proposition does not always hold.
A. INFLUENCE FACTOR
The fallacy of the influence argument can be shown by
some recent experience of the world's arms suppliers. The
Soviet Union has little influence with Egypt after a massive
arms transfer policy for nearly twenty years. The Russians
were unable to deter the destruction of the communist party
in Indonesia in 1965 despite the fact that Indonesian forces
gWilliam B. Quandt, Influence Through Arms Supply: The
American Experience in the Middle East . Paper presented at
Conference on Implications of the Military Build-up in Non-
Industrial States. Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy,
6-8 May 1976. p. 2.
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were equipped with Soviet arms. The U.S. supplied arms
on a large scale to Turkey and Greece, but the U.S. had
little influence with either country in the Cyprus crisis.
The U.S. supplied arms to Pakistan but had little impact
when it came to bringing a halt to conflict between India
and Pakistan. The massive amounts of weapons transferred
to the Republic of Korea has not appears to have helped the
U.S. influence the Park regime to lessen the repressive
treatment of its citizens. The arms sales to Chile appear
to have done little to secure the release of the thousands
of political prisoners in Chile. If arms sales do gain the
seller influence why have the U.S. and the Soviets not been
more successful in influencing these events?
Arms sales do not gain one influence because as stated
by George Kennan, "the fact is that the sale of arms does
not give one very much prestige" and therefore little ability
9
to influence the recipient of those arms. Additionally,
arms sales generate many other "costs" that negate any
influence value, in the long run, of arms sales. One of the
costs which has just recently been recognized as a result
of the sale of our latest and best equipment is in the area
of technology transfer.
9Fred Kaplan, "Still The Merchants of Death," The




Technology is as valuable an economic resource as the
7
traditional factors of production of land, labor and capital.
Technical progress has contributed to U.S. economic growth
through its effect on international trade. A large and
important portion of U.S. exports are products of high and
rapidly advancing technology. Design and manufacturing
know-how impacts a country's strategic capability far more
than applied research and development. The receiver of
know-how gains a competence which serves as a basis for many
subsequent gains. The U.S. has enjoyed and relied on its
"qualitative edge" in weapons development as a counterbalance
to the numerical advantage enjoyed by potential adversaries'.
'All these advantages enjoyed by the U.S. as a result of its
technical superiority may be endangered by the sale of high
technology weapons
.
There is little data and few studies available to provide
policymakers who are considering the sale of high technology
items to a foreign government with information on the impact
of the sale on U.S. security. One recent report of a two
year study effort by a Defense Science Board Task Force
was published in February 1976. This Task Force was divided
into four subcommittees which studied the high technology
of four industries: airframes, aircraft jet engines, instru-
mentation, and solid state devices. The four subcommittees






that control of design and manufacturing know-how is
absolutely vital to the maintenance of U.S. technological
superiority." Compared to this, all other considerations
of technology transfer are secondary. The Task Force further
concluded that to preserve strategic U.S. leadtime, export
should be denied if a technology represents a revolutionary
advance to the receiving nation, but could be approved if
the advance is evolutionary.
The impact of hardware transfer can be partially coun-
tered. If the hardware goes to its intended destination
for its intended use an assessment can be made of its impact
on the U.S. If the hardware does not go to its intended
destination or if it is not used as intended then its value
can be reduced by shutting off follow-on spare and replace-
ment equipment. Damage to U.S. security tends to be limited
because machines have finite utility and a finite useful
life. This is not so with technology. The U.S. cannot be
assured of the uses to which it is put, cannot recall it,
nor is it necessarily a wasting asset.
Technology transfer takes place in many ways and varies
in each case. At one end of the continuum is simple visual
inspection and at the other is transfer of a complete pro-
duction facility. Any country with know-how, resources,
10Office of the Director, Defense Research and Evaluation,
An Analysis of Export Control of U.S. Technology - A POD
Perspective. Washington, D.C., 4 February 1976.
24

will and time can acquire any weapon or military capability
it chooses. Export controls can retard that attainment of
military capabilities which would be detrimental to U.S.
security but cannot stop them. Delay then is the measure
of success of export controls.
Many sales of military equipment have been accomplished
by way of co-production and licensing agreements. These
agreements allow a country to produce the equipment entirely
within its own borders under license, necessitating complete
technology transfer for the item; or to produce a portion
of the components of the equipment, thereby gaining partial
technology transfer for that item. From 1960 to 1975, cc-
production or licensing agreements valued at $9.8 billion
were signed. An additional $2.1 billion worth of agree-
ments are being considered. These agreements include
armored personnel carriers, howitzers, tanks, rifles, machine
guns, ammunition, helicopters, anti-tank rockets, aircraft
and naval vessels.
Y Technology may not be the only loss with co-production
and licensing agreements. These agreements could also re-
sult in a loss to U.S. labor assuming the countries involved
would buy directly from the U.S. if no co-production or
12licensing alternative were available.
FMS — A Growing Concern , op. cit. , p. 22
12 tw • AIbid.
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The DOD has issued guidelines to insure that critical
technological know-how and equipments are not transferred.
However, there are many areas where the transfer of seem-
ingly non-critical equipments may make possible major ad-
vances by other countries. For example, the commercial
sale of ball bearing manufacturing equipment might contri-
bute to unexpected rapid development of an adversary ' s MIRV
capability.
The lack of information on the impact of technology
transfer on the technological development of a country indi-
cates that more research must be done in this area if the
arms sales program is to continue at its present high level.
Research needs to be done to assess the consequences of
technology transfer through sales on the U.S. economy and
the national security. The lack of studies and only recently
expressed concern about technology transfer, after the
exponential growth of sales, may indicate that sales are
made without adequate prior attention or appreciation of
the long term effects.
C. END USE CONTROL
Once delivered, the U.S. has limited control over FMS
material whether it be technology, weapons or information.
Co-production and licensing agreements as well as material
sold under an FMS case contain clauses which restrict trans-
fer to a third country; however, no formal procedure exists
to insure that transfers are not made without prior approval
26

of the U.S. Government. Military Assistance and Advisory
Groups (MAAGs)
,
Missions and intelligence agencies do moni-
tor end item use and disposition but, to a very limited
degree. Even the transfer clauses ultimately result merely
in a right of first refusal if scrapping is planned. It
is likely that equipments being disposed of by demilitari-
zation and scrap sale could reappear as operating equipment
in other countries' forces. There is also the possibility,
as pointed out by Senator Hubert Humphrey during the 1976
Foreign Assistance Hearings, of substantial weapons trans-
fers as oil-rich countries buy newer equipments and transfer
1"*
older weapons from their large inventories.
Differences also exist between the restrictions on
third-country transfers of defense articles contained in
the Foreign Military Sales Act and restrictions on commer-
cial sales controlled by the International Traffic in Arms
14Regulations (22 CF.R. 121 et. seq.). Under the FMS Act,
the President cannot consent to transfer unless the U.S.
Government itself would transfer the defense article to the
country. No such restraint exists on granting U.S. approval
to a transfer under the Arms Regulations. Additionally,
the restrictions on third-country transfers in subsection
1*3 ...
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Foreign Assis -
tance Authorization; Arms Sales Issues . Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance. March 26/April 5, 1976.
FMS: A Growing Concern, op. cit. , pp. 22-23.
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3(a) of the FMS Act are not applicable to sale of U.S.
Government defense services, which include the sale of
defense information used in furnishing military assistance.
The U.S. has no statutory control over transfers of defense
articles produced by the purchasing country using such
defense information.
Lastly, the possibility of an unfriendly takeover of
a large FMS customer, e.g., Iran, by an adversary would
result in the U.S. facing its own latest and best weapons
(F-14, TOW, DD-963). In addition, the unfriendly country
would have the opportunity for thorough examination of
these systems. Although not an FMS equipped country, the
Republic of Vietnam provides an example where approximately
$5 billion worth of military equipment provided by the
U.S. was lost to an unfriendly communist country.
Controlling the offensive use of weapons transferred
to other countries has been such a widely recognized failure
that it needs little mention. The reader merely need think
of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, the Indo-Pakistani War
or the Israeli Three Day War to appreciate the inability
to control end use.
The total result of U.S. inability to control end use
of arms it supplies to another country is that there is a
good chance that those arms will be used against U.S. inter-
ests. There is a strong possibility that this may occur
with increasing frequency and with more serious consequences
28

in the future simply because of the many billions of dollars
worth of U.S. arms spread around the world.
D. MANPOWER COSTS
The process and organization for approving and delivering
military sales items has changed little since security
assistance programs were first organized at the close of
World War II. The original intent was that the existing
elements in each armed service which procured weapons and
equipment for that service should also be used for foreign
arms transfers. Procurements for foreign governments were
managed on a case-by-case basis as small side accounts to
U.S. procurement.
Although there have been some recent changes, today's
foreign military sales are still managed that way. The
fragmented and ad hoc pattern continues even though sales
have grown to fifteen percent of U.S. procurement, involve
considerably more negotiation than the grants of the earlier
period, and now deal in highly sophisticated weapon systems.
Foreign sales are still largely administered along the three
separate but roughly parallel lines in the Army, Navy and
Air Force. It is in the Service headquarters that most
negotiation with foreign governments and manufacturers occur.
Congressional Budget Office (Staff Working Paper)
.
Foreign Military Sales and U.S. Weapons Costs . CBO-1106.
Wash., D.C., GPO, 5 May 1976. p. 1.
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With the rapid growth in foreign sales, the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) has assumed a more active role in
overseeing the FMS function. In 1971, the Defense Security
Assistance Agency (DSAA) was formed as the primary agent
responsible for administering all DOD security assistance
programs. The director of the DSAA, a three star military
officer, reports directly to the Secretary of Defense. With
personnel resources totaling approximately 90 people, DSAA
is authorized to direct, supervise, and administer all
security assistance plans and programs. While much of the
administration is, out of necessity, delegated to the
Services, the responsibility remains with DSAA. DSAA does,
in fact, become involved in the majority of approved sales
cases. It reviews any sales requests from Iran and Saudi
Arabia, all requests which involve major weapon systems, all
cases with a value over $5 million, co-production proposals
16
and sales to restricted countries.
The Director of DSAA is also the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
(DASD/ISA) . ISA is the other major OSD organization
primarily involved in security assistance management and
is referred to in the DOD as the "little State Department."
ISA is responsible for forming security policy for sales,
assistance and credit programs. As a result of his two
16Department of Defense Instruction (DOD INST) 5105.38
of 11 Aug 1971.
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positions, the Director of DSAA is charged with both forming
and executing security assistance policy.
Almost every major organization in DOD takes at least
some minor role in the sales and assistance function. The
expanding portion of DOD personnel involved in this function
has led to growing concern over manpower strains. FMS
personnel (other than those assigned to MAAGs and Missions)
are allocated under the DOD manpower ceiling set each year
by Congress. While the DOD tries to recover full costs for
the personnel efforts in FMS, the foreign customers' payments
for manpower costs do not translate into additional manpower.
Over the last five years, the ceiling has been steadily
lowered, while at the same time the FMS personnel burden has
dramatically increased. Because of the potential for
diplomatic incidents due to non-support of an FMS contract,
security assistance functions will probably receive the
necessary manpower from DOD resources even if they are taken
away from areas that support U.S. combat readiness. The DOD
has proposed legislation that would remove security assistance
manpower requirements from the manpower ceiling, allowing
them to fluctuate depending on the amount of reimbursable
funds available which would equate to the volume of sales.
Until this is approved, FMS manpower requirements will be in
competition for manpower resources dedicated to U.S. forces.
In 1975 there were 4,868 man-years expended on administra-
tive support of FMS, perhaps another 1,000 others directly
reimbursed from FMS cases, and 3,711 in MAAGs, Missions and
31

overseas military commands that have security assistance
program functions. The MAAG personnel are included because
most MAAGs have outlived their usefulness in administering
grant assistance and concentrate their efforts mostly on
17facilitating military sales.
The DOD Acquisition Advisory Group has reported that
the FMS program "has been the source of many problems." The
military departments allege that OSD management direction
has been confused and conflicting, resulting in adverse and
destabilizing impact on weapon system acquisition programs.
Pentagon project managers have complained that FMS places
extraordinary demands on them for a myriad of reasons
.
Financial problems exist in the FMS programs, such as,
current estimates that about $300 million of old FMS order
receivables may be invalid and that the Army has had over-
18
expenditures in excess of $500 million.
A memorandum dated 23 January 1976 from the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, William P. Clements, Jr., to the
General Accounting Office. Assessment of Overseas
Efforts of the U.S. Security Assistance Program . Report
ID-76-1. Wash. D.C.: GPO, 31 Oct 1975. pp. i, 23.
In 1974, primary MAAG activities were to
maintain channels for dialog with host country
military organizations, facilitate U.S.
military sales, and provide sources of informa-
tion so that host countries could obtain
technical assistance for material received from
U.S. sources. These activities represent a major
shift from those of the 1950* s and 1960 's.
18Tad Szulc. "Kickback: Corrupting U.S. Arms Sales."
New Republic, 17 Apr 1976. pp. 8-11.
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Services stated that FMS had indeed, produced an impact
"on cost, schedule, and performance aspects of several
major programs involving procurement for U.S. armed forces."
Clements had instituted periodic breakfasts at the Pentagon
in October 1975 to discuss foreign sales ("FMS Working
Breakfast Meetings") but the January memo noted that "I am
still concerned that there is not a sufficient appreciation
among Defense Department managers for the size and complexi-
ties of the FMS program and of the serious impact this pro-
gram has on many of our ongoing major weapon system acquisi-
tion programs." The memo further stated that "approved
FMS programs are consistent with and supportive of U.S.
foreign policy. We must manage these programs efficiently
and at the same time insure that our organization and re-
sources are so structured as to adequately support the
management and accomplishment of the Defense Departments
19
major weapon system acquisition programs."
A memo from Admiral F. H. Michaelis, Chief of Naval
Material, to Admiral J. L. Holloway, Chief of Naval Opera-
tions, reported the views of Secretary Clements as expressed
in October and November 1975 at the FMS Breakfasts. Cle-
ments said that he had noted that there continues to be the




not our mission. He expressed his concern at this attitude,
and suggested that DOD is going to be deeply involved in
FMS for the next fifteen years. When Admiral Michaelis
complained that the Services lacked manpower to execute the
FMS mission, Clements replied that the priorities of FMS
must make themselves felt and personnel assigned, but these
assignments should be made with the full understanding that,
if necessary, personnel will have to be "pulled-off lower
priority jobs to support the security assistance mission."
Noting that the Deputy Secretary of Defense has said
that FMS programs must be managed "efficiently", whereas
major weapon system acquisition programs need only be
"adequately" supported, one might consider almost any U.S.
force support mission to be of lower priority and therefore
eligible to have personnel "pulled-off" to support FMS.
An example of either increasing manpower requirements
of FMS or of the identification of personnel handling FMS
has occurred in USAF headquarters. Within the headquarters,
staffs are being reduced each year, sometimes by Congressional
action, sometimes by top-level initiatives. At a time when
the Air Staff was being reduced by over 200 spaces the
Military Assistance and Sales Directorate (an agency of
the staff) was receiving an increase of 19 persons (30%
21
increase) which was probably less than it actually required.
20 T , .,Ibid .
M.T. Smith. U.S. Foreign Military Sales: Its Legal
Requirements, Procedures, and Problems . Paper presented to
Conference on Implications of the Military Build-Up in Non-
Industrial States. Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.
6-8 May 1976.

It is clear that FMS program management is a big and
growing problem for the DOD as evidenced by the fact that
U.S. Navy sales were $175 million in 1969 and $3.8 billion
in 1974; Army procurement in 1975 was $1.1 billion for the
U.S. Army and $1.9 billion for FMS; and the Air Force had
$500 million in open FMS cases in 1968 but $6.2 billion
today. What is unclear is whether weapon sales really
should be a mission of the Department of Defense and, if
so, whether it will take precedence over support of U.S.
forces. This is particularly serious at a time when
personnel ceilings are declining while FMS personnel
requirements are growing.
E . INVOLVEMENT
However successful the U.S. arms program has been in
other areas it has not accomplished the objective of reducing
U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf area.
In February 1975 there were 2,100 Americans working in
22Iran under the FMS program. A Senate Foreign Relations
Committee report on the Middle East estimated that 50,000
to 60,000 American military technicians, maybe even more,
will be needed by 1980 to help maintain and operate the
$10.4 billion worth of arms that Iran has purchased from
this country since 1972. Iran, according to the study,
22
Michael T. Klare. "Arms for the Shah: Hoist with our
own Pahlavi." The Nation. 31 January 1976. pp. 110-114.
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cannot go to war without U.S. support "on a day-to-day
23basis." Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Amos Jordan
testified to the House Committee on International Relations
in July 1975 that in 1975 there were approximately 45,000
U.S. personnel including 25 , 000 DOD personnel in the Per-
sian Gulf States. He estimated that by 1980 there would be
150,000 including 50,000 Defense Department personnel.
"V Arms sales constitute a first step toward a U.S. commit-
ment to the government of the purchasing country. Sales of
weapons are normally followed by soldiers, sailors and air-
men, as well as civilian technicians who are required to
train the purchasers of the equipment. These large concen-
trations of American citizens tend to involve the U.S. deeply
in the affairs of the purchasing country. There is a danger
that these people could be held hostage to influence U.S.
actions or that the U.S. would have to become directly
involved in their behalf in case of war.
Grant aid programs also commit the U.S. to the government
of the receiving country; however, the difference is that
2 1
U.S. Senate, U.S. Military Sales To Iran , A Staff
Report to the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance of the
Committee on Foreign Relations. Washington, D.C., GPO,
July 1976, pp. VII-XIV.
House International Relations Committee. The Persian
Gulf, 1975: The Continuing Debate on Arms Sales . Hearings




aid programs are proposed by the Executive Branch and approved
by the Congress. FMS is proposed by the recipient country
and approved by the Executive Branch with Congressional
*
review required only if the sale is to be over $7 million.
As the U.S. increases its investment in a local regime
through credits advanced, training personnel deployed and
other facets of military support dependency, its stake in
the survival of the client state is expanded. There becomes
an increasing danger that third world conflicts could precip-
itate a clash between the great powers. This danger was
vividly exemplified in October 1973 when military personnel
of both the U.S. and USSR were sent to the edge of the
Israeli-Egyptian battlefield to supervise deliveries of
advanced armaments
.
There could easily be a very serious problem for the
U.S. if conflict developed among its client states. As
stated by Congressman Les Aspin, "arms sales could easily
.,2 5
embroil us in an unwanted conflict, a new Vietnam.
Nowhere does this seem more likely than in the Persian Gulf
States where we have committed ourselves so heavily in
support of Iran and Saudi Arabia.
F. ARMS RACES
The apparent willingness of the U.S. to sell arms to
almost any country that wants to buy them not only commits




it to countries where it may become involved in local con-
flicts, the sales may also tend to encourage those conflicts
It is difficult to fight a war without weapons. The ready
availability of weapons and countries that want to sell
them may encourage countries to arm themselves and to use
these arms to settle differences that might otherwise be
negotiated.
The arms sale dynamic commits the U.S. inexorably to
sell more and more arms, whether policy makers wish to or
2 f>
not. When one nation obtains supersonic aircraft or
modern tanks, its neighbors and rivals naturally feel a
need to obtain equivalent or superior weapons in order to
protect their security. This process perpetually threatens
to precipitate armed conflict, for when one country feels
that it has a temporary advantage in firepower it will be
tempted to invade its weaker rival (as, for instance, when
India invaded Pakistan in 1971) . Conversely, when a nation
suspects that pending arms transfers will shift the balance
of power in favor of a rival it will consider immediate in-
vasion in order to preclude a future attack by a stronger




26Fred Kaplan. "Still the Merchants of Death." The
Progressive . March, 1976. p. 25.
Michael T. Klare. "The American Empire at Bay; The




With almost unlimited funds at their disposal, the
Middle Eastern countries are frantically engaged in building
up large military machines, while the major industrial
nations, with the exception of Japan, all vie with one
another to pour arms into the region, and the Soviet Union
arms Syria for its purposes. If one looks far enough into
the future, it is hard to envision an arms race of such
magnitude that will not lead some nation somewhere down the
2 8line to use the weapons it has procured.
The basic imperatives that appear to underlie the arms
trade are that wars occur with astonishing frequency. In
the last thirty years, there have been 119 armed conflicts
involving 69 nations and since the U.S. has reduced its
role as the world's policeman, regional powers feel the
need to protect themselves. The question is whether
shipping billions of dollars worth of weapons is the best
way to world peace. The U.S. Congress has expressed con-
cern over the potential effects of arms sales on regional
arms races which encourage certain countries to place too
much emphasis on military considerations at the expense of
social-humanitarian concerns, and identification of the
U.S. with regimes which appear to adopt repressive practices, 29
George W. Ball. "The Looming War in the Middle East
and How to Avert It." Atlantic Monthly . January 1975.
pp. 6-11.
29FMS: A Growing Concern. op. cit.
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What is disturbing about American "policy" on arms sales,
particularly in the Persian Gulf, is that there seems to
be no long-term policy. Little or no thought has been
given to the long-term impact these sales may have on the
array of military forces in the Persian Gulf ten years from
now. Nor has Washington examined the effects of an uncon-
trolled arms race on the smoldering tensions among Saudi
Arabia, Iran and Iraq or the potential for internal con-
flict within each country. The handling of arms sales
on a case-by-case basis leads to little concern for arms
balance, regional stability or overall analysis of all
factors (military, economic, resources, etc.) either viewed
from a global or regional perspective that they may impact.
If there were a complete, long-range, in-depth look at
military exports from an aggregate standpoint, that is,
what the effects of today's sales will be ten years from
now, such an analysis might lead to a different military
sales policy. Washington now seems to be committed to the
arms trade because of a deeply held conviction that if the
U.S. does not sell arms to a country that wants them, some-
one else will. Lieutenant General H. M. Fish, Director of
DSAA, said "put bluntly, our friends want to deal with us.
31
But if we refuse, there are others waiting in the wings."
30
"The Arms Sales Threat." Op. Cit.
"Anatomy of the Arms Trade." Op. Cit
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While the U.S. does not sell nuclear weapons to foreign
countries, it has, according to Admiral Larocque, sold or
given away more than 18,000 missiles, ships and aircraft
capable of carrying such weapons. "it is now within the
capability of almost every nation to develop or obtain
nuclear weapons to go with those missiles, ships and
32
aircraft," he warns.
The cumulative impact of increasing arms sales has been
to quicken the pace of militarization of underdeveloped
areas and help fuel an upwardly spiraling "balance of terror",
in certain key areas, particularly the Persian Gulf, that
could lead to an unending series of local wars or even a
ma j or world war.
G. U.S. READINESS
While increasing the likelihood, or at the least, in-
creasing the ability of a country to participate in a war,
FMS may also decrease the ability of the U.S. to fight
those wars if necessary. In addition to the manpower drain
on already strained personnel resources, there has been a
reduction of U.S. combat readiness in some areas to accomo-
date arms transfer programs and there exists possibilities








DOD testimony to the Senate Authorization Committee
in April 1975 pointed out some adverse impact on U.S. force
readiness had occurred as a result of equipment drawdowns
to assist friendly foreign governments. The accelerated
emergency support to the Republic of Vietnam and Israel
adversely affected overall U.S. readiness because: (1)
Equipment was taken from active U.S. forces to satisfy
foreign requirements, (2) Prepositioned and depot stocks
were reduced below desired levels, and (3) Equipment of or
destined for reserve forces was diverted or withdrawn and
transferred to foreign countries.
General Fish has written that some selected items
were withdrawn from reserve and prepositioned NATO war
35
reserves for Israel as a result of the October 1973 War.
He admits that these withdrawals had an adverse impact on
our short term ability to deploy reinforcements to Europe
if the heed arose. Fish indicated that this is not our
"normal way of doing business" but that in the long term
would speed up force modernization.
Actions were taken to alleviate these shortages,
but it will be a long time before certain items can be
FMS: A Growing Concern . pp. 27-29.
35
H. M. Fish. "FMS", Commanders Digest . Vol. 17,
No. 22, 29 May 1976.
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replaced including Army main battle tanks and APC's, Air
Force F-4 fighter aircraft, air munitions, electronic
countermeasure equipment, and Navy A-4 aircraft.
A 19 May 1975, report of the Senate Committee on
Armed Services stated that:
"The Committee is concerned about the
serious drain on the inventories of
U.S. Forces caused by the transfer of
major equipments to other nations
through the Foreign Military Sales
program since these transfers obviously
reduce the combat readiness of our
forces to some degree and delay planned
force modernization." 36
As a case in point, the U.S. Army estimated that its equip-
ment shortfall from foreign sales would not be made up
until the end of Fiscal Year 1978.
Withdrawal of equipment may in some cases speed-up
force modernization plans by creating emergency situations
where forces are without weapons. It appears, however,
that sales of equipment resulting in five year shortfalls
takes an unnecessarily large chance with U.S. security.
2 . Logistic Support
The U.S. is committed, as a matter of policy, to
provide logistic support for defense articles furnished to
"3 C
U.S. Senate, Committee On Armed Services, Report On
Authorizing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1976 and July-
September 1976 Transition Period For Military Procurement,
Research and Development, and Active Duty, Selected Reserve,
and Civilian Personnel Strengths And For Other Purposes ,"
94th Congress, First Session, Report No. 94-146, Washington
,
D.C., GPO, 1975. pp. 160-161.
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foreign governments under FMS. The length of this commit-
ment depends on various factors including foreign relations,
program plans, contractual agreements, and the Defense
Department's ability to continue the support. The range of
logistic support and services is extremely broad and may
consist of any logistic service mutually agreed upon. The
Military Departments are responsible for providing the re-
quired support or for assuring support will be available
from other sources.
An important issue related to logistic support pro-
vided to foreign countries is the direct impact on U.S.
forces. There are indications that the number of equipment
items for some weapon systems belonging to foreign govern-
ments may eventually equal or exceed those in U.S. forces.
The DOD could then be obliged to commit a larger share of
its resources to support these items, which could reduce
both manpower and material resources available to U.S.
forces. An example is the 448 A- 4 jet aircraft owned by
various foreign countries. The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps
purchased approximately 2000 A-4 aircraft but are not rapidly
37
retiring them from service. In the very near future
foreign air forces will be operating more A-4s than U.S.
forces but support, in most cases, will continue to be pro-
vided by the U.S. Another example was the A-l aircraft of
John W.R. Taylor, Editor, Jane's All The World's




the Republic of Vietnam Air Force (VNAF) which were supported
by the U.S. logistic system but were not in active service
in U.S. forces. Additionally, the sale of equipments not
in U.S. force inventories certainly increases future logis-
tical support problems in that resources are consumed in
providing one-of-a-kind support to foreign governments.
3. Supply Support
The DOD encourages the purchaser of major weapon
systems to "buy into" the DOD/Service supply system with
38
a Supply Support Arrangement (SSA) contract. Such an
arrangement amounts to the recipient country putting up a
certain amount of money for the supply system to buy and
manage spare parts for it. The Service uses its expertise
in helping the country determine a range and depth of stock
level. The country receives the benefits of the U.S. on-
going supply system, and volume purchasing power, without
all the problems of running the "wholesale" end of the
supply system. The SSA allows the country access to DOD
supply channels like any U.S. unit. It becomes another
"customer", like U.S. customers, whose requisitions and
shipments are based on the DOD priority system. If the
»
foreign country has a higher priority requisition than a
U.S. unit, then the foreign country's requisition is filled
first.
38Military Assistance and Sales Manual . Op. Cit. , Pt.




In theory, the addition of foreign money to the
supply system should allow the Services to increase their
stock level in proportion to the potential increase in
usage. In practice, the area that gets the most thorough
going over during the budgetary process and is most likely
to be reduced is the area of spares procurement. Spares
procurement is an unexciting area and the effects of budget
cuts do not show up immediately. Consequently, the spares
program is often underfunded even for U.S. force require-
ments. Since the foreign government has "bought into" the
DOD supply system and pays its bills, it expects service.
It expects to receive items when ordered and if it does
not, then the parts problem becomes a diplomatic problem
.
since it is a part of a government-to-government agreement.
It is not difficult to foresee shipping critically
short items to a foreign military service to prevent or
alleviate diplomatic incidents * and thereby further degrading
U.S. force readiness capability. There is an additional
concern for U.S. force readiness because of degraded logis-
tic support as a result of FMS , that is, creation of
shortages by design.
The free access to the DOD supply system afforded
to the foreign government by the SSA and the inadvertant
mistakes inherent in any large, computerized, impersonal
39 . ...
system may make "Murphy's Lav/" a reality. A requisition
"5 Q
Murphy's Law. Anything that can go wrong will go wrong,
anything that can be done wrong will be done wrong.
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for one each will come out 1000, a gross will be ordered
when 12 are desired, the next higher assembly, a gun mount,
will be delivered when a cotter pin was needed. In non-
crisis times, this causes no great problem. The items are
returned and no one gets upset. But if the supply system
can be emptied by error it certainly can be emptied by
design.
It would not be difficult to determine critical
high-use items in the supply system. By simply ordering
against a high priority requirement, a customer could
"corner the market" on high use, low position assets and
put a crimp in operational response in any number of common
weapon systems used jointly by the U.S. and foreign forces.
H. UNIT COST SAVINGS
One frequent rationale given for a large volume of
foreign military sales is that sales to foreign governments
help reduce the unit cost to U.S. forces and enable the
U.S. to get more for its defense dollar. The Congressional
Budget Office did a study on "Foreign Military Sales and
Weapons Costs" at the request of the Senate and House Budget
41Committees. The study stated that evaluation of the FMS
program in the past had depended chiefly on security and
40
U.S. Foreign Military Sales; Its Legal Requirements ,
Procedures, and Problems . Op. Cit.
41
FMS and U.S. Weapons Cost. Op. Cit.
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foreign policy judgements. Recent debates, however,
extended to the economic consequences of foreign sales,
particularly their secondary effects in reducing U.S.
weapons costs and requirements. The study found that while
some individual cases do produce substantial savings against
a given weapon's total program costs, such cases are
"exceptional." Large savings do not seem to be generally
characteristic of FMS and it is difficult to identify
consistent savings resulting from reduced requirements on
U.S. military resources as a result of FMS 1 strengthening
of recipient states, according to the CBO study.
Certain sales, such as those to NATO allies, may reduce
pressure on U.S. resources. Most FMS, however, go to the
Middle East where more important policy concerns, such as
distribution of U.S. weapon technology or fueling an arms
race, complicate and overshadow cost evaluations. For a
few selected weapon systems, the savings from foreign sales
are substantial, ranging up to fifteen percent of a weapon's
procurement costs in a given fiscal year and eight percent
of its total research and development costs. These research
and development (R&D) cost recoveries appear to be the
largest single source of FMS savings.
R&D savings result mostly from sales of recently developed,
high technology systems, particularly new fighter aircraft and
missiles. Thus, savings are directly tied to the transfer,
at cost, of recent and sophisticated U.S. weapon technology.
The R&D recovery of cost amounts to a surcharge added to the
48

purchase price of a weapon system. For a new system these
charges are a pro-rata share of the R&D costs based on the
share of the total number produced. For example, if the
U.S. developed a new fighter aircraft with R&D costs of
$803 million, bought 400 for itself and sold 80 to a foreign
government, then the R&D recoupment would be $160.6 million.
This is, in fact, the amount charged to Iran for its pur-
chase of 80 F-14 fighter aircraft from the U.S. Navy.
The question in this sale, as with any sale of high
technology systems, is whether it is in the U.S. interest
to make this technology available at cost to foreign pur-
chasers. Does the U.S. gain more by holding exclusive con-
trol of its weapon technology or by sharing it with selected
customers? And is there really a selection process which
determines which customer should receive the system, or is
it sold to anyone who has the money? As to whether all
FMS serve U.S. foreign policy, "if in a given case the
answer is no, it seems unlikely that cost savings would be
sufficient to serve as a counterbalance," the CBO study
comments
.
If the weapon system is not newly developed then R&D
recoupments are on a percentage basis of the total purchase
price of the equipment. Normally this is four percent but
can be less with the approval of DSAA.
Another possible cost savings resulting from FMS is in
the area of reduced unit production costs. These can amount
49

to fifteen percent of annual procurement costs. The lowered
per unit production cost results from increased volume which
FMS orders add to U.S. procurement. Under certain production
circumstances, increased volume can mean lower unit costs.
These savings can be a result of economies of scale or of
increased production experience. The foreign orders may
increase a contract order to a volume that can be manufac-
tured more efficiently, or they may provide more production
learning and reduce costs for subsequent -U.S. purchases.
In both cases, the marginal benefits will diminish after a
given volume or level of experience has been reached. For
most sales, such as ship ammunition, artillery, military
equipment, and services for which R&D and other costs have
been absorbed (the great majority of FMS) , there appears
to be little or no unit cost savings resulting from foreign
orders. The U.S. Marine Corps, for example, estimates that
it has not realized any substantial savings because of sales
42
to foreign governments . The relationship between FMS
and increased DOD weapon costs will therefore depend less
on how many total sales dollars are earned than upon how
many sales of newly developed, high-technology systems
are permitted.
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps Letter FDB-76-pab
to Secretary of the Navy, Subject: Congressional Budget
Office Paper "Foreign Military Sales and U.S. Weapons
Costs," of 1 June 1976.
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Additionally, production cost reductions do not always
represent clear savings. There may be additional costs
associated with the foreign order that would offset unit
cost savings. The addition of foreign orders can, for
example, mean U.S. procurement is delayed. Delayed U.S.
purchases can mean additionally inflated budgetary costs,
although not necessarily higher real costs. More important,
the presumed delay in procurement means that U.S. forces
are temporarily denied a needed resource and must expend
additional maintenance resources on a system that is to be
replaced. There are also other offsetting costs that may
decrease unit cost reductions from foreign orders. One of
these is production readjustments caused by the foreign
order. The U.S. Navy reported a savings of $60 million in
its F-14 program as a result of the foreign purchase of
the aircraft; however, costs increased by $120 million be-
43
cause of production readjustments. This resulted in unit
production costs going up rather than down because of FMS.
Twenty-five to thirty percent of foreign military sales
are for services such as repair, training, administrative
effort, overhauling, construction and supply operations.
These sales do not create cost savings and in fact may gen-
erate some indirect non-monetary cost by straining limited
resources which the Armed Services draw upon for support of
their own programs.
43FMS and U.S. Weapons Cost. Op. Cit. , pp. 8-10.
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I. DEFENSE INDUSTRY DEPENDENCE
There is an economic dynamic which may occur when large
sales of U.S. weapons are made to attain economies of scale
when domestic demand is insufficient. When domestic demand
is low, U.S. industries look for external sources to main-
tain their production base. As stated by John C. Bierwirth,
Chief Executive Officer of Grumman Aerospace Company,
Inc., "Grumman 's future breaks on international business,
we've got to become less dependent on the U.S. Navy and
sell to a great many countries. Then if Congress cuts,
44
others can take up the slack."
The difficulty then arises that U.S. arms manufacturing
companies become dependent on fluctuating, unpredictable
levels of external demand. If an arms manufacturer's future
breaks on international business then it can be reasonably
assumed that he will expend every effort to assure that
there is opportunity to increase that business or at least
attempt to forestall any restrictions on his sales. The
unit cost benefits to the DOD and perhaps the very survival
of the company can be assured only by maintaining a consis-
tently high export level. Defense industries may feel
forced to exert whatever political and economic pressure
they can bring to bear to assure continuing high or increasing
44Louis Kraar. "Grumman Still Flies for the Navy, But
It Is Selling the World." Fortune . February 1976. p. 79.
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arms sales levels with little regard to the long term
security interest of the U*Sv Even the customer may assist
in this as in the case of Jordan threatening to buy air
defense missiles from the Soviets when the U.S. hesitated
in approving their request for HAWK missiles.
-fr The net result would be tremendous pressure to dis-
regard or make exceptions to arms sale policy to "save"
the industry. This pressure might be easy to withstand if
the arms sale policy objectives were clear and agreed upon
throughout the government. Unfortunately, this does not
seem to be the case with U.S. arms sale policy.
J. ARMS SALE POLICY
It has been said that if you know the programs then
policy can be deduced. With that assumption in mind, the
U.S. arms sale policy might be said to be sales and more
sales. Yet the Congress has declared that arms sales should
"be approved only when they are consistent with the foreign
45policy interests of the United States." The question is
how does one determine that the sale is in the national
interest, consistent with foreign policy of the U.S., and
that such sales will strengthen the security of the United
States and promote world peace?




Various statutes and Presidential delegation of author-
ity make the Secretary of State responsible for military
exports. Yet there seems to be a lack of State Department
sanctioned, well-defined foreign policy objectives to which
government officials may refer when contemplating specific
military sales to specific countries. There also appears
to be no overall plan that addresses where the U.S. is,
where it wishes to go, and what should it do to get there.
When Representative Lee Hamilton (Indiana) asked Joseph
Sisco of the State Department, "Is there any linkage between
arms sales and availability of oil?", Sisco answered,
47
"No." Might it not be in the national interest to link
arms sales with oil availability?
Senator Edward Kennedy stated that it would be intoler-
able for the U.S. to become arms merchants to the world in
order to help our balance of payments or even to provide
jobs for workers here in this country. Jobs and balance
of payments are both vitally important. But they must not
dictate our arms sale policy, where we run the risk of
starting conflicts that could drag us in, at terrible cost
in lives and money. "Its simply a false and dangerous
U.S. FMS: Its Legal Requirements, Procedures, and
Problems . Op. Cit.
, p. 34.
47The Persian Gulf, 1975. Op. Cit. , p. 39.
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economy to try solving domestic problems with arms sale
48policy." Yet the Military Assistance and Sales Manual
lists aiding the U.S. balance of payments and providing
employment as a positive effect of FMS. Are there procedures
and guidelines to assist the decision-maker in making choices
between jobs and long term security of the U.S. when
considering a possible arms sale?
A study of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
determined that military spending is growing at a rate of
nine percent per year in developing countries, twice the
rate of spending increase in the developed countries, and
49
also twice the rate of economic growth in the third world.
Has the Congress or the Executive Branch set a limit on
amount of sales per year per country or even worldwide?
Mr. Sisco testified to Congress that arms sales policy
is not based on any principle of balance or presumed balance
between Saudi Arabia and Iran. It is based on the perceived
security needs and interest of Saudi Arabia as that country
sees its situation in relationship to the threat it sees in
the neighboring countries, and likewise, how it perceives
its security needs in relation to its geopolitical situation.
"Should U.S. Limit Arms Sales in Mideast?" U.S. News
and World Report , 8 March 1976. pp. 43-44.
4 9
Michael T. Klare. "The Pentagon Bleeds the Third
World." The Progressive. 25 June 1974. pp. 21-25.
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Congressman Hamilton asked, does that mean "...we sell them
whatever they want." ° The approximate $5 billion in arms
sales to Saudi Arabia from 1972 to 1975 make it appear that
the U.S. sells them whatever they want. Have long term
interests of the U.S. been taken into account or only those
of Saudi Arabia?
Senator Hubert Humphrey observed that a 1973 amendment
to the FMS Act declared that the government should get out
of the arms sales business and encourage more commercial
company-to-foreign government sales. Yet, the year after
that policy was enacted, government sales reached a new
peak — and they continue apace. This policy reversed the
trend of more and more government control and involvement
in arms sales started by the Neutrality Act of 1936.
Subsequent action by the Congress has negated the reversal
and has in fact established more control and more Congres-
sional involvement than previously was the case. This rapid
change of policy does make one wonder if the Congress felt
in 1973 that the foreign policy interests of the U.S. would
be better served by commercial companies selling arms to
foreign governments. Or, were there other reasons?
The lack of answers to the questions posed above and
the confused and contradictory nature of the above issues
indicate that U.S. arms sales policy has not developed as
50Persian Gulf, 1975. op. cit., p. 32.
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quickly as sales themselves. The arms sale program appears
to be an ad hoc response to individual arms requests rather
than a well-formulated policy. 51 The change from grant aid
to foreign military sales has effectively transferred nearly
all authority from the legislative to the executive Branch
of government. Customers request arms from the State
Department, which determines if it is in the U.S. interest
to make the sale and, if so, the Pentagon acts as purchasing
agent negotiating a deal with the manufacturer. Sometimes
even State is not allowed adequate time for review as in
1972 when President Nixon gave the Shah of Iran virtual
carte blanc to buy just about any non-nuclear American
weapon he wanted without allowing the analysts time to study
52the implications.
There appears to be little long range planning in the
process of selling arms, only broad policy guidelines that
are called arms sale policy, and divergent views on the
purpose and long range goal of FMS in relation to overall
U.S. foreign policy.
Congressman Pierre DuPont, in a report of a study mission
to the Middle East, summed up the arms policy problem as
follows. At present, the U.S. lacks a cohesive arms sales
William H. Anderson. The Impact of Foreign Military
Aerospace Sales on the Industrial Base . Master's Thesis.
Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, April 1976. p. 22.
52
"Anatomy of the Arms Trade." op. cit. , p. 40.
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policy and considers arms sales on a case-by-case basis.
As a result of inadequate procedures for considering an
overall sales policy, the sale of U.S. arms has escalated
to the point that Gulf States are annually ordering over
$4 billion in arms, or over forty-five percent of annual
world wide sales.
U.S. arms sales to the Persian Gulf countries are and
should remain, said Congressman DuPont, an instrument of
American foreign policy in that region. However, the U.S.
must define better the objectives and examine more carefully
the impact of its arms sales to the Gulf countries and the
53
risks engendered by those sales.
Committee on International Relations. Report of a
Study Mission on U.S. Arms Sales to the Persian Gulf ,
22-31 May 1975 . Wash., D.C. : GPO, 19 December 1975.
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III. THE BENEFITS OF FMS
In developing and implementing FMS Policy, the U.S.
Government has created in recent years a structured review
process that operates within the framework of the Foreign
Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Acts. The review
procedures vary depending on the type of case. According
to the State Department, all major cases must be approved
by senior State officials. Within State, cases are reviewed
by the Regional Bureaus involved and by the Bureau of
Politico-Military Affairs. Very important cases may involve
the President or the Secretary of State in making decisions.
According to the State Department, the basic goal in
evaluating a military supply relationship with a foreign
country is to make the best possible systematic judgement
for total U.S. interests, just as other U.S. international
political judgements are made. This assessment by the State
54Department involves the following considerations:
1. Political.
- What role the country plays in its surroundings, what
interests it has in common with the United States, and
where U.S. interests diverge.
- Whether the transaction will do more to further U.S.
objectives on balance than other economic or political
measures.
FMS — A Growing Concern , op. cit. , pp. 13-14
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- The position of influence the sales might help to
support, including the potential restraint that can
be applied in conflict situations.
- Whether a particular sale will set a precedent which
could lead to further requests for arms or for similar
requests from other countries.
- The current internal stability of the recipient
country, its capability to maintain that stability,
and its attitude towards human rights.
- The possible adverse impact on U.S. relations with a
friendly government of not making the sale.
- The options available to the recipient country. Will
a refusal result in the country ' s turning to other
sources of supply? What sources? What will be the
political, military, and economic implications of this?
2. Economic.
- Whether the proposed sale is consistent with the
recipient country's development goals or with the
U.S. Economic Assistance Program, if there is one.
- Whether the sale might strain the country's ability
to manage its debt obligation or entail operations
and maintenance costs that might make excessive claims
on future budgets.
- The economic benefits to the United States from the





- The threat the military capability is supposed to
counter or deter-, U.S. agreement on the nature of the
threat, and relation to U.S. security.
- How the proposed transfer affects the regional military
balance, regional military tensions, or the military
buildup plans of another country.
- Whether the recipient country is capable of absorbing
the arms effectively.
- Whether other military interests — for example, U.S.
overflight rights or access to facilities — would be
supported by the transaction.
- The impact on U.S. force readiness.
- Whether a substantial physical dependence on U.S.
sources of supply could enable the United States to
better control conflict under some circumstances.
Many of these considerations involve direct benefits
which accrue to the United States from Foreign Military
Sales. The remainder of this chapter will discuss these
economic, military and political benefits in greater detail.
A. ECONOMIC BENEFITS
Advocates of the Foreign Military Sales Program have
been hesitant to expound on the economic advantages accruing
from arms sales for fear of inviting the charge of being
"merchants of death." The only economic advantage that
defenders of arms sales are usually willing to promote is

the rather general, and politically popular, goal of improving
the balance of payments posture. Occasional references are
made to additional employment or reduced weapons costs, but
rarely is any detail provided.
However, during the past several years there has been a
great deal written about this subject including several
papers prepared by the Congressional Budget Office. They
have attempted to detail through the use of various economic
models the entire spectrum of micro and macro economic
benefits realized from Foreign Military Sales. While it
seems that no one suggests that economic gain should be a
primary objective of our Foreign Military Sales Policy,
there is a general consensus that the economic impact of
arms sales must be a consideration in the decision making
process. This is especially true given our current stagnant
economy with its high level of unemployment.
1. Balance of Payments
Since October 1971, when the United States foreign
trade balance showed a deficit for the first time since
1893, the balance of payments problem has been regarded as
55 . .
a major foreign policy issue. The large military grant
aid programs of the past and the stationing of U.S. troops
overseas have both contributed significantly to balance of
payments deficits. Defense and State Department representatives
55
"The Pentagon Bleeds the Third World," op. cit. , p. 23.
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have become very sensitive to their part in the dilemma,
and have engaged in an intensive campaign to expand sales
of U.S. military equipment abroad partially as a method of
offsetting the balance of payments outflow. These arguments
have even found a certain amount of sympathy among concerned
lawmakers. Wisconsin Congressman, Les Aspin, in an article
highly critical of U.S. arms policies admitted, "...it is




A measure of the actual impact of arms sales upon
balance of payments is shown in Table IV. Since the figures
in the table represent actual cash flow, they do not
correspond to previously presented arms sales figures, which
are based on contracts signed for future deliveries and
payments. That means that sales figures can be expected to
climb precipitously as payments are made on large contracts
signed in fiscal years 1973, 1974, and 1975. Examination of
the table reveals that only in 1971 did military sales
prevent a deficit in the balance of goods and services.
However, in 1973, 1974, and 1975 military sales accounted
for 35%, 83%, and 24%, respectively, of the surplus in the
balance of goods and services. Therefore, military sales
have played a significant role in maintaining a positive
balance of payments position for the U.S.




U.S. Balance of Payments, 1971-1975
(in billions of dollars)
ITEM 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
Exports of Goods and Services 66.3 73.5 102.7 144.8 148.4
Merchandise, Excluding Military 42.8 48.8 70.3 98.3 107.1
Military Sales 1.7 1.2 2.4 3.0 3.9
Other Services 8.7 9.6 11.6 17.3 19.2
Investment Income 12.9 13.9 18.6 26.2 18.2
Import of Goods and Services -65.5 -78.1 -95.8 -144.2 -132.1
Merchandise, Excluding Military -45.5 -55.7 -69.6 -103.7 -98.2
Military Expenditures -4.8 -4.7 -4.5 -5.0 -4.8
Other Services -10.3 -11.6 -12.9 -16.5 -17.0
Investment Income -4.9 -6.1 -8.8 -16.0 -12.2
Balance on Goods (Merchandise)
Balance on Goods and Services
-2.7 -6.9 .7 -5.4 8.9
.8 -4.6 6.9 3.6 16.3
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce.
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After showing a record surplus of $11 billion at
the end of 1975, the government recently reported that the
U.S. imported $4.1 billion more than it exported during the
57first ten -months of 1976. This increasing deficit would
be even greater without the added benefit of weapons
exports such as the recent sale of the General Dynamics F-16
to four NATO nations. The planned General Dynamics production
schedule is such that the U.S. will be a net exporter of
F-16's for the foreseeable future with an estimated net
export value of $1.25 billion through 1983. When estimated
third country sales of 425 additonal U.S .-produced planes
are added to the NATO sales , the net export value of the
58F-16 program increases to $4.1 billion.
The question of U.S. balance of payments as it
relates to FMS has been analyzed in depth in a recent study
by the Congressional Budget Office. Using two computer
models of the economy, the 1976 version of the Data Resources
Incorporated (DRI) Quarterly Model and the 1975 version of
the Wharton Annual and Industry Model, this analysis estimated
the impact of a ban on FMS starting in FY 77. The results
show that by FY 81 a ban on FMS would result in a decrease
59in net exports of approximately $7.5 billion.
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"U.S. Imports Exceed Exports During Initial Ten Months
of 1976," Monterey Peninsula Herald , 30 Nov 1976, p. 2.
FMS - A Growing Concern , op. cit. , p. 21.
59The Effect of Foreign Military Sales on the U.S. Economy ,
Congressional Budget Office, CBO-1109, 23 July 1976, p. 21.
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2. Recycling of Petrodollars
Closely related to the favorable impact of FMS on
our balance of payments is the fact that U.S. sales of
military hardware are a means to recoup some of the billions
of U.S. dollars spent on Arab oil without having foreign
nations gaining a foothold in our economy by investment and
wholesale purchase of American corporations. As a result of
increased American purchases of petroleum from the Middle
East and the rising price of crude oil, the supply of dollars
in Arab hands has grown at a spectacular rate. According to
Walter Laquer of the Institute of Contemporary History in
London, Middle East profits from oil sales will reach an
estimated $30-$50 billion by 1980, which at the present rate
of growth could accumulate to "$1,000 billion" by 1990.
A Pentagon official has been quoted as remarking that "the
biggest long-range problem facing the U.S. in the Middle East
is finding a way to get the Arabs to spend their dollars
without letting them get control of our economy." A
somewhat more cautious assessment of this problem was offered
by Under Secretary of State Sisco in 1973:
"The Saudis and other oil rich [Arabian] Peninsula
States have begun to accumulate large foreign
exchange reserves well beyond their needs. They
have now indicated that if [oil] production is
to rise beyond their income requirements, they
must find productive outlets at home or abroad
to invest their surplus revenues. This is a
challenge to the consumer countries generally
and to our American businessmen specifically." 62





. , p. 48.

It appears that the oil producers have found an
outlet for their excess revenues as evidenced by the recent
dramatic increase in arms sales to the Persian Gulf States.
Figure 3 shows a comparison of FMS and U.S. oil payments to
the Persian Gulf States. Although a causal relationship
can not be concluded from the data in Figure 3, there appears
to be a strong correlation in the trend lines for FMS and
U.S. oil payments to the Persian Gulf States.
3. Employment
The impace of FMS on employment takes on added
significance during this era of high employment. President
Carter has indicated a desire to reduce the current levels
of arms sales; however, concern for an adverse impact on
employment may postpone any immediate reduction. Various
estimates have been reported on the relationship between FMS
and employment. Former Secretary of Defense Schleshinger
has estimated that 100 jobs in American industry are sustained
63
for each million dollars in Foreign Military Sales. The
Congressional Budget Office has predicted that a ban on FMS
starting in FY 77 would result in an unemployment rate .3
percentage points higher in FY 81 than if sales were to
continue at the current level between FY 77 - FY 81.
Stated in terms of jobs, this would mean approximately
350,000 fewer jobs by FY 81. 64
"U.S. Military Assistance and Sales (U.S. is number one!),"
The Defense Monitor , May 1974, p. 3.
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The Effect of Foreign Military Sales on the U.S. Economy ,




Comparison of FMS and Oil Payments to the Persian Gulf States
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Oil Payments (U.S. imports)
Source: House Committee on International Relations. Persian Gulf, 1975
.
and Bureau of International Commerce, Department of Commerce.

The Aerospace Industry is particularly sensitive to
armament sales. Despite the general recession gripping the
country, employment in the Aerospace Industry was 948,000
in June 1974, a drop of only 1,000 from June 1973. Since
the U.S. unemployment rate had reached seven percent by
mid 1974, if the aerospace industry had not been involved
in producing aircraft and missiles for foreign buyers, there
is no doubt that a significant drop in employment would have
been sustained. For example, Northrop Aircraft employment
was up ten percent during 1973, with the F-5E International
Fighter accounting for a portion of the increase. The
F-5E is produced only for foreign customers. It is not used
by American forces. Bell Helicopter employment also rose
during 1973, with much of the increase in engineering and
technical personnel due to the Iranian Air Force purchases
65
of advanced helicopters. Moreover, recent arms sales will
provide a buffer against future economic problems. General
Dynamics estimates the total employment increase at the
peak of F-16 production in the early 1980' s will be about
65, 000. 66
The stimulus provided by FMS to employment in the
Aerospace Industry is not limited to that industry alone.
"Aerospace Employment Outlook Mixed", Aviation Week
and Space Technology . 12 November 1973. p. 39.
FMS - A Growing Concern. Op. Cit. , p. 22.
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Because of the purchases of materials outside the Aerospace
sector and its extensive subcontracting network, the indus-
try creates additional employment throughout the economy.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics specifies an employment multi-
plier of 1.73 which means that it generates additional em-
ployment in supporting industries at a rate of 73 workers
6 7per 100 Aerospace employees.
4
. Lower U.S. Weapons Costs
Pentagon officials and defense industry spokesmen
have long contended that lower U.S. weapons costs are a
valuable by-product of the FMS program; however, only
recently, in a report prepared by the Congressional Budget
Office, has the relationship between FMS and weapons costs
been analyzed in detail. This study estimated that the
$8.2 billion sales program for FY 76 would produce weapons
6 ft
cost savings of $560 million. For a complete analysis
of the cost savings for the 35 major weapon systems included
in the CBO Study see Appendices A through D.
Recoveries of Research and Development costs are the
most direct and largest source of savings. R&D savings
vary according to a weapon's development costs and the length
of time the system has been in production. For systems
67
Bulletin 1672, Department of Labor, Washington, D.C.,
1971, p. 125.
6 8Congressional Budget Office. Budgetary Cost Savings
to the Department of Defense Resulting from Foreign Military
Sales. CBO-1107. 24 May 1976.

which have been in production for less than five years,
R&D charges are prorated, otherwise, a flat percentage
of up to 4 percent is added to the purchase price. 69 Since
the requested R&D appropriation for each of the services
is reduced by projected FMS R&D receipts, R&D savings
provide a measure of relief to the taxpayer.
The second major source of weapons cost savings is
lowered per unit production costs. These savings result
from economies of scale and/or increased production experi-
ence: foreign orders may increase a contract order to a
volume that can be manufactured more efficiently, or they
may provide more production learning and reduce the costs
for subsequent U.S. purchases. Accordingly, the greatest
savings tend to come from sales which place large foreign
orders early in production.
Maintenance of a production base is the third poten-
tial source of savings. These savings arise when a break
occurs in orders from the U.S. Services for specific weapons
and equipment. Once initial orders are satisfied, it may
become necessary to close production facilities and to later
reopen them when additional orders are required. Both the
closing and reopening of production facilities involve
expenses which add to U.S. procurement costs. If foreign
69DOD Instruction 2140.1, June 17, 1975.
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orders for these items can be interspersed with U.S. orders,
production is maintained and the closing and opening costs
are saved.
Another advantage of FMS keeping U.S. production
lines open has recently come to light. The U.S. has been
able to postpone a production decision on the problem plagued
STOL Transport (AMST) because production lines for the C-130
aircraft were kept open for FMS orders. This made it possi-
ble for the U.S. to purchase additional C-130s without
incurring start-up costs while waiting for the AMST to
70become available.
5. Defense Industry Business
Many defense industries, the aerospace industry in
particular, have come to depend on FMS to remain solvent.
This dependence arose during the post-Vietnam era when high
Vietnam related expenditures began to decline and many U.S.
aerospace firms experienced substantial cut-backs in defense
contracts. Consequently, these firms were forced to order
massive layoffs and it was feared by some companies that
this reduction in business would precipitate the shutdown
of entire production lines and possibly even corporate
bankruptcy. In order to forestall this eventuality, many
firms began intensive efforts to establish foreign markets
for their military hardware. President Nixon's 1973
70
"An Alternative To The AMST", Aviation Week and
Space Technology , 12 November 1976, p. 28.
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waiver decision lifting the ban on military sales to Latin
America and the desire of oil-rich Middle Eastern countries
to purchase modern armaments, have opened the new markets
sought by the ailing aerospace industry.
Undoubtedly, the most publicized example of a com-
pany rescued from financial collapse was Grumman' s sale of
80 F-14 aircraft to Iran. Since this sale, the company has
regeared itself largely toward the expanding field of U.S.
arms exports. The leader of this new tack is John C. Bier-
with who says, "Grumman 1 s future breaks on international
business ... we've got to become less dependent on the
72U.S. Navy and sell to a great many countries." In the
years ahead, Grumman expects to find as much as a third of
its aerospace business abroad, compared with only 6% in
731975. yJ
6. Non-Military Exports
Foreign Military Sales frequently provide the
opportunity for increased sales of non-military items to
recipient nations. Offices opened in foreign countries to
coordinate training in weapons operation and facilities
construction serve as convenient locations from which feelers
can be sent out to explore possible commercial sales.
71n The Pentagon Bleeds The Third World", Op. Cit. , p. 21.
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"Grumman Still Flies for the Navy, But It Is Selling






In addition, the high quality of U.S. Weapons serves
as an advertisement for U.S. commercial goods and services.
Most important, however, Foreign Military Sales promote
friendly ties from which good trade relationships can be
built.
United States commercial sales in the Persian Gulf
Region have been closely tied to arms sales. (See Table V.)
Page Communications, a subsidiary of the Northrop Corporation
which sold the F-5E to Iran, installed the Iranian National
74Telephone System. Similar sales coincide with the U.S.
capturing 25 percent of the Persian Gulf commerical import
75
market in 1974, amounting to $3.4 billion. In congressional
testimony concerning the relationship between FMS and
commercial exports, Claude Akins , the former Ambassador to
Saudi Arabia, said "...the suspension of military sales [to
Saudi Arabia] would be interpreted as a very unfriendly act
and then in their economic programs they would tend to look
to countries that were more forthcoming in selling them
76
military equipment."
Latin America is another region where commercial
sales have followed FMS. When the U.S. instituted an arms
embargo against Latin America, France quickly moved in to
74Gerald Erion and John Harter, United States Foreign
Military Sales to Iran; Major Advantages and Disadvantages ,
Air Force Institute of Technology, August 1975, p. 76.






FMS and U.S. Commercial Exports in the Persian Gulf
(in millions of dollars)
Country 1972 1973 1974 1975
Iran
FMS Orders 524 2,114 3,917 2,568
U.S. Commercial Exports 559 771 1,734 3,242
Saudi Arabia
FMS Orders 337 626 2,539 1,374
U.S. Commerical Exports 314 442 835 1,502
Kuwait
FMS Orders * * 30 370
U.S. Commercial Exports 111 119 209 366
*
less than .1
Source: General Accounting Office and Bureau of International
Commerce, Department of Commerce.
75

fill the vacuum. Shortly thereafter, as an outgrowth of
military sales, France acquired commercial business in both
Argentina and Brazil. The Argentine deal was for an
unreported value of communications equipment. The Brazilian
order called for a $60 million air traffic control system. 77
7. Taxes
The sale of our products to a foreign purchaser
generates a significant indirect flow of funds to the United
States Treasury. The Wharton Annual Econometric Model
indicates that approximately 65 percent of the value of
equipment produced in the U.S. for sale to foreign customers
eventually flows into the U.S. Treasury in the form of tax
78
receipts. This revenue comes from the 4 8 percent tax
applied to corporate profits of companies engaged in foreign
sales (less taxes paid to foreign governments) and personal
income taxes paid by stockholders and industrial workers.
8 . Access to Oil
Denial or curtailment of the access to oil in the
Persian Gulf represents a threat to the security and economic
well-being of the U.S. and other Free World Nations. The
judicious use of FMS to deflect that threat is clearly
79
consistent with our national interest. Joseph Sisco in
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"Worlds Armorer", Forbes , 15 May 1973, p. 138.
78The Impact of Foreign Milit
Industrial Base , Op. Cit. , p. 24.
79
"U.S. Security an
4 September 1975, p. 5.
ary Aerospace Sales on the
d World Stability," Commander's Digest ,
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congressional testimony has stated that, "One of the
objectives that we have in the [Persian Gulf] area which our
arms sales support, is continued access to the region's oil
80
supplies..." The use of FMS to achieve this objective has
had some success in that Iran did not participate in the
1973 Arab oil embargo and the Shah has indicated that he
81
won't participate in any future boycott against the West.
More recently Saudi Arabia broke with the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) by limiting its oil
price increase to five percent and increasing production
to offset the OPEC ten percent increase.
B. MILITARY BENEFITS
The FMS program has frequently been touted as a valuable
element of our national security. This view has been ex-
pressed by the Defense Department which regards FMS as
"complimentary to its defense role and national security
82
mission." Foreign Military Sales have been recognized in
a recent GAO Report as "supporting the military goal of
collective security, providing the U.S. with a first line
8
The Persian Gulf, 1975 , Op. Cit. , p. 14.
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FMS — A Growing Concern, Op. Cit. , p. 4.
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of defense, and enhancing U.S. ability to respond to
8 3perceived threats."
On the other hand, the FMS program has been accused of
adversely impacting on U.S. Force Readiness. During the
October 1973 war in the Middle East, the U.S. sent Israel
selected items of equipment primarily from U.S. Reserve
Force inventories and from prepositioned North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) war reserve stocks in Europe.
As a result, according to Deputy Secretary of Defense
Clements, there has been some adverse impact on our short-
term ability to deploy reinforcements to Europe. Moreover,
reserve modernization has been delayed. Eventually, however,
improved modernization will result as the older equipment
diverted to allies is replaced with more modern items. In
addition, these requirements have focused attention on the
need to augment parts of our own production base for
84
supplying the total U.S. forces.
It is important to recognize that equipment was shipped
to Israel in a crisis situation in which Israel's very sur-
vival was at stake. General Fish, Director, DSAA has stated:
"...meeting foreign requirements from
assets in the hands of U.S. units, or
being produced to equip those units,
is not our normal way of doing business.
Equipment is diverted from U.S. re-
quirements only when such action is
83 Ibid, p. 4.
"Foreign Military Sales," Commander's Digest , 29
May 1975, p. 3.

determined to be in the best interests
of the United States in coping with
the situation. Most sales are from
production arranged specifically for
the foreign buyer, and this production
helps rather than hurts the equipping
of U.S. forces." 85
The Arms Control Act of 197 6 requires the President to
submit full justification to Congress for the sale of any
defense article or service which could have a significant
effect on the combat readiness of the Armed Forces of the
United States. Therefore, it seems unlikely that FMS will
lead to reduced U.S. Force readiness in the future.
1. Friendly Force Capability
Foreign Military Sales enable allied and friendly
third world countries to carry out missions in support of
U.S. National Security interests. Using FMS to strengthen
NATO forces allows European Nations to assume greater
responsibility for their mutual defense which lessens the
need for U.S. forces in Europe. Also, due to the qualita-
tive improvement in arms transferred to third world coun-
tries, there exists the potential for joint military opera-
tions. Iran's purchase of P3C Aircraft and DD-963 Destroyers
has provided the possibility for some contribution to the
86




Edward Laurence, The Changing Nature of U.S. Arms
Transfers: Implications for U.S. National Security Planning
and Policy Research, Naval Postgraduate School, p. 7.
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military officials suggest one reason for their military
buildup is to defend and keep open the narrow Straight of
Hormuz through which pass tankers carrying more than half
87
of the West's oil supply.
Increased friendly force capability decreases the
probability of active U.S. involvement in conflict situa-
tions. In support of this viewpoint General Fish has
commented that "Perhaps most important of al'l is the fact
that the military capability provided by FMS can reduce the
88likelihood of U.S. military involvement." A decreased
probability of active U.S. involvement subsequently reduces
the Pentagon's military requirements in terms of numbers
and kinds of weapons, resulting in savings which are poten-
tially far more important than savings realized from unit
production price reductions and R&D cost sharing reim-
89bursements for weapons sold through FMS.
2 . Equipment Standardization
There is now a growing acceptance of the need to
standardize weapon systems in NATO or at least make these
systems interoperable or interchangeable to the greatest
degree practicable. This acceptance results from the
recognition that:
87
"The Arms Dealers: Guns for All," Time , 3 March
1975, p. 42.
88
"Foreign Military Sales," Commander ' s Digest , Op.
Cit.
, p. 8.




(1) NATO's conventional force effective-
ness must be improved, (2) defense budgets
throughout the alliance will be further
constrained, (3) resources are being
dissipated unnecessarily on duplicative
developments, (4) lack of interoperability
and interchangeability of alliance equip-
ment considerably reduces force effec-
tiveness and (5) the costs to support
the resulting variety of weapons types
is much larger than would be required for
standard or at least interchangeable
equipment. 90
The economic rationale for NATO standardization
has been expressed by Major General Richard C. Bowman,
Director, European and NATO Affairs, ISA, as follows:
"The case for standardization in NATO
remains compelling. Particularly since
the post-1973 price increases in energy,
pressures on allied economies and defense
budgets have made force improvement
difficult. To maintain an adequate
defense in these circumstances NATO must
use available resources as effectively
as possible. "91
A 1975 DOD report on NATO standardization concluded that
the lack of standardization costs the alliance several
92billion dollars each year. The cost of duplicating
research and development efforts was highlighted in a 1975
NATO study of short range air defense systems costs which
found that for quantities typical of European requirements
the total multinational procurement costs for a single
90European Defense Cooperation . Hearing before the
Subcommittee on Research and Development, Senate Armed
Services Committee, 31 March 1976, p. 100.
91
"NATO Standardization," Commander's Digest , 9
September 1976, p. 2
92
European Defense Cooperation , Op. Cit. , p. 51.

system were about 25 percent lower than for independent
93programs. Excessive logistics support costs also contri-
bute to the problem. It has been estimated that with
greater standardization the Allied Commander Europe (ACE)
94
mobile force could reduce its logistics staff by one-half.
The greatest justification for standardization is
military effectiveness because the highest immediate cost
NATO could sustain would be a failure to deter or blunt a
Warsaw Pact attack. Commenting on the relationship between
military effectiveness and standardization, General Bowman
has stated that, "Based upon actual experience with NATO
military exercises over the years, we know that insufficient
standardization is a serious handicap to alliance military
95
effectiveness." General Andrew J. Goodpaster, former
Supreme Allied Commander Europe, has observed that NATO
is not getting a satisfactory return on its weapons expen-
ditures. He has noted that, "We are losing at least 30
percent and in some areas 50 percent of our capability due
96
to the lack of standardization."
While most new transatlantic weapons standardization









European Defense Cooperation, Op. Cit. , p. 53.

in some cases it will be more cost-effective for European
allies to buy complete systems or components of systems
from the U.S. However, whether or not standardization is
achieved through coproduction, as in the case of the F-16,
or total system purchase, the FMS program is the only
mechanism currently available for the sale of U.S. equipment
to NATO. Therefore, FMS will play a vital role in
achieving the goal of standardization.
3. Maintenance of U.S. Base and Overflight Rights
The movement away from a bipolar international
system has greatly expanded the flexibility of third world
97
countries. This has meant that a common ideological back-
ground is no longer enough to guarantee U.S. base rights.
The recent situation in Turkey is indicative of this devel-
opment. When the U.S. Congress imposed an arms embargo
against Turkey after its troops invaded Cyprus, Turkey
quickly responded by severely restricting U.S. base rights.
Also, negotiations with the Philippines for continued use
of Subic Bay and Clark Air Base, both vital forward U.S.
bases in the Pacific, have been stalled because of a lack
of agreement on military and economic aid. The value of
U.S. base rights and the use of arms to secure them is
exemplified by the recent exchange with Oman of $1.5 million
97





worth of TOW anti-tank missiles for the use of an airfield
for "occasional flights and in case of contingency needs." 98
4. U.S. Logistics Support Base
In a crisis situation, the operational advantage
of a widely dispersed logistics base could be decisive. For
example, in the event it ever became necessary to deploy
forces to the Persian Gulf area in support of U.S. -Iranian
interests, it is reasonable to expect that Iranian facilities
could be used by American forces and that urgent U.S. spare
99part requirements could be provided by Iran. This would
not only be of strategic value, but a joint-use of similar




Maintenance of U.S. Industrial Base
The capacity of the defense industrial base is a
serious problem to the Department of Defense. For example,
the Armed Services consider a large and established aerospace
production line to be a national resource because for each
of the aircraft production sectors (large bombers, fighters,
and military transports) there are actually only a few
potential production lines. With procurements less than
98The Persian Gulf, 1975 , Op. Cit. , p. 43.
99United States Foreign Military Sales to Iran, Op. Cit.
,
p. 61.
100,,Why We But the Weapons We Do," Op. Cit. , p. 40.
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50 percent of what they were seven years ago, it is becoming
increasingly difficult to keep production lines open. This
threat to the industrial base is of great concern in terms
of both mobilization and competition.
The erosion of the Defense Industrial Base has been
particularly evident in the Aerospace Industry. In his book,
Arming America
,
Ronald Fox, former Assistant Secretary of
the Army (Installations and Logistics) says that the debt/
equity ratio of Aerospace companies in the years 19 64 to
1970 rose from .25 to .57. There are indications that this
picture has worsened in recent years. The debt/equity ratio
of defense contractors is as much as 50 percent greater than
that of commercial companies. This, combined with the
declining defense buying power, the difficulty experienced
by Aerospace contractors in obtaining credit, and the
declining profits in the Defense Industry, makes the picture
anything but bright.
Foreign Military Sales have become a significant
factor in overcoming this threat to the U.S. Industrial base.
For example, in 1975 the U.S. Army's FMS exceeded its own
procurements. The FMS program, at a level of $8 billion
per year, is certainly a major factor in the total procurement
J. Ronald Fox, Arming America: How the U.S. Buys





budget. Through these sales, the U.S. is able to broaden
and expand the capacity of the Industrial Base and, therefore,
the FMS program directly contributes to U.S. wartime
mobilization capability.
C. FOREIGN POLICY BENEFITS
It has been in the area of Foreign Policy that FMS
opponents have registered their sharpest criticisms. Mem-
bers of Congress are concerned that the rapid growth of
U.S. arms transfers abroad has taken place without adequate
consideration being given to the potentially destabilizing
effects of such transfers. However, a recent Comptroller
General report characterized the FMS program as "a useful
102
and highly effective instrument of Foreign Policy."
According to the State Department, security relationships
are an important element of Foreign Policy and are neither
more nor less subject to uncertainties than any other tool
of policy. Theoretically, this aspect of Foreign Policy
could be dispensed with; but, at a time when the United
States needs to utilize its capabilities to the maximum,
it would be pointless to forego using any tool that, when
wisely used, promises substantial benefit at an acceptable
cost and risk.
1 ft?






Foreign Military Sales provide the U.S. with an
opportunity to exert political influence and leverage on
those countries who buy American-made military hardware. Arms
sales are considered to be an effective means of strengthen-
ing the bonds of dependency that tie foreign arms recipi-
ents to their supplier. Therefore, the more sophisticated
and expensive the weapons sold, the more dependent the buyer
becomes on training, spare parts, ammunition, etc. which
are available only from the supplier. This dependence in
turn provides the supplier with considerable political in-
fluence on the actions of the buying nation. Additionally,
military training, if it succeeds in inculcating shared
values, may be a particularly useful basis for future
attempts to exert influence.
William Quandt in an article on influence gained
through arms supply states that this type of influence has
been most effective in the following instances: Decisions
concerning military operations or policy concerning war and
peace; Deterring action as opposed to reversing it; Reversing
undeclared policies; Crisis situations. Quandt believes
that the suspension of an ongoing arms relationship, followed
by a negotiated resumption of the flow of arms for some
specific change of policy on the part of the arms recipi-
ent, is the pattern of arms supply most conducive to success-
ful influence attempts. This pattern was used by the U.S.
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in the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War to get Israel to
accept a ceasefire proposal which, unfortunately, was later
rejected by Sadat of Egypt. The United States was also able
to prevent Israel from destroying the Egyptian Third Army
by threatening to stop arms shipments. This action may well
have kept the Soviets from intervening in the war and thus
prevented a U.S. - Soviet confrontation. 104
2
. Developing Friendly Ties
Foreign Military Sales have proven beneficial in
establishing good relations with foreign governments.
Deputy Defense Secretary William P. Clements, Jr. has stated
that "Arms sale programs form an important link, a bridge,
to foreign countries . . . foreign governments are grateful
105
and they develop strong bonds with us." Arms sales are
considered particularly useful for winning and preserving
the friendship of foreign political and military elites;
which in many third world countries have a substantial —
if not decisive — role in determining national policies.
These leaders are increasingly eager to acquire modern
aircraft and other advanced hardware and in many instances
104 Influence Through Arms Supply . Op. Cit. p. 16.
1 OS
"Anatomy of the Arms Trade," Op. Cit. , p. 42.
106 "The American Empire at Bay," Op. Cit. , p. 47.
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look upon arms sales as an equal, if not greater, measure
of friendship than economic assistance.
From a psycho-social viewpoint, arms sales serve
as a mechanism to improve relations with other nations
because they provide the opportunity for frequent contact
107on the international level. Attitude changes result from
exposure to foreign persons which lead to increased open-
ness and trust between key people. Cooperative undertakings
on an international level tend to stimulate mutual under-
standing and promote an atmosphere of reduced tension be-
tween nations. A beneficial spin-off of more frequent
international contact is the buildup of improved avenues
for world communications which counteract the natural divi-
sions which tend to arise from national or ethnic loyalties.
3. Regional Stability
One of the principal objectives of the FMS program
is to strengthen deterrence and promote peaceful negotiations
by helping our friends and allies to maintain adequate de-
fense forces of their own. Commenting on this objective
General Fish says, "We seek to achieve regional stability
in crucial areas of the world without the need for direct
108intervention by American forces." This philosophy was
exercised in the Persian Gulf after Great Britain withdrew
107
Ronald Graves, Military Export Sales: Their Role
in National Security , Air Command and Staff College, May
1974, p. 91.
108
"U.S. Security and World Stability," Op. Cit. , p. 3
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its troops from that region in 1968. Instead of the U.S.
replacing Great Britain as the great power "policeman" in
the Persian Gulf, it was determined that this role should
be filled by local powers strong enough to fill the police
* .. 109function.
The FMS program has led to greater regional stabi-
lization in several areas. Speaking before Congress, Under
Secretary of State Joseph Sisco said, "We believe that the
arms policies that we have pursued in relationship to Iran
and Saudi Arabia in particular have contributed ... to
greater regional cooperation." He cited as an example
Iran and Iraq who were able to work out their differences
because Iran developed a strong defensive capability which
motivated Iraq to settle their border dispute by peaceful
means. In discussing regional stabilization in the Middle
East, General Fish has argued that "The Middle East repre-
sents an area where our security assistance programs have
helped immeasurably to stabilize a volatile area, thus
avoiding the need for great power military intervention
and the dangers of confrontation."
Critics of arms sales claim that weapons sold to
the Persian Gulf promote instability because of the potential
109
"The American Empire at Bay," Op. Cit. , p. 45.
11QThe Persian Gulf, 1975 , Op. Cit. , p. 6.
111h U.S. Security and World Stability," Op. Cit. , p. 5.
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problem of arms transfers from that region to Arab countries
bordering Israel. Current U.S. policy addresses this problem
by requiring all FMS contracts to include a prohibition
against weapons transfers without prior U.S. government
approval. Although enforcement of this provision is
difficult, may countries will respect the agreement for
fear of being denied future arms sales or support for
existing equipment. Also, U.S. technicians stationed in
arms purchasing countries to provide maintenance, training
and supply support, are able to monitor U.S. weapons to the
extent that they would know very quickly in most cases if
112
equipment was transferred. Finally, even though U.S.
control of arms transfers is somewhat limited, it is better
than the alternative. Amos Jordan, Assistant Secretary of
Defense, ISA, testified before Congress that "The chances of
transfers of arms from the Persian Gulf to the Arab-Israeli
front would be infinitely greater if the U.S. didn't sell
them arms because arms will be purchased elsewhere without
*. • *. ,,113any constraints.
4. Counter Soviets
According to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
the Soviet Union from 1965-1975 was the second largest
112The Changing Nature of U.S. Arms Transfers , Op. Cit. ,
p. 6.
113The Persian Gulf, 1975, Op. Cit., p. 107.
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supplier of weapons to the Third World with sales totaling
over $13 billion. The Soviet Union continues to transfer
massive quantities of war material to nations outside the
Warsaw Pact States. Many third world countries seek to
purchase Soviet weapons because Soviet arms exports are
highly competitive featuring concessionary credit terms and
115
cut-rate prices.
The Soviet Union has not hesitated to use arms sales
to gain influence throughout the third world. In hearings
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, General Fish
reported:
"We are unaware of a single Russian turndown
of a prospective arms client. The Soviet
Union has shown that it can move rapidly
to exploit new opportunities. Its military
assistance program has enabled Moscow to
establish a strong presence within recipient
countries and given it an opportunity to
influence the recipient. "116
The most recent example of this Soviet strategy has been in
Africa where the Russians have supplied arms to the Popular
Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and to Rhodes ian
guerillas in Mozambique in order to strengthen their foothold
on the African continent. Soviet arms supplies to Africa
14World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers . U.S
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Wash. D.C., p. 18.
115
"Foreign Military Sales," Op. Cit. , p. 2.
Foreign Assistance Authorization: Arms Sales Issues
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance,
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. June, November and
December 1975, p. 33.
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have already enabled them to gain influence in Somolia where
the Russians now have a base which is along the main oil
supply route to the U.S. and Western Europe.
The FMS program provides the U.S. with a means to
counter Soviet influence in the third world and prevent its
spread to new areas. This has been particularly true in the
Persian Gulf and Middle East where U.S. arms sales have kept
the Russians from gaining influence in such countries as
Jordan, Oman and Kuwait, thus preventing the Soviets from
achieving a dominant role in the Arab world. However, should
the U.S. limit arms sales to this region, the USSR would move
quickly to fill the void. This became clearly evident when
King Jussein of Jordan threatened to purchase anti-aircraft
missiles from the Soviet Union when the U.S. Congress
hesitated in approving Jordan's request- for. KAWK..mi s s i 1 e
batteries.
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"New Perils in Arms Sales to MIDEAST," U.S. News &




In analyzing the pro and con arguments presented in
Chapters II and III, it is apparent that there are both
"real" costs and "real" benefits associated with U.S. arms
sales. While an arms sale may result in economic benefits,
such as improving the balance of payments and lowering U.S.
weapons costs; military benefits in the form of U.S. base
rights; and foreign policy benefits, such as developing
friendly ties with foreign governments, it may also include
certain costs such as the loss of vital U.S. technology and
the increased chance of U.S. involvement in foreign conflicts
However, there seems to be one significant factor which
distinguishes between the benefits and costs of FMS. The
majority of FMS benefits. are currently being enjoyed while
the majority of the costs are the problems that may occur
in the longer term.
The present costs of FMS appear to be few in relation
to the possible future costs. The monetary cost of the
approximate 10,000 man-years expended by DOD on FMS in 1975
are significant, but the more important cost is the absorp-
tion of the limited manpower resources available to the DOD.
There have been costs in dollars and cents as a result of
production readjustments caused by foreign military sales
orders and material readiness was degraded as a result of
drawdowns on U.S. Force equipment to support the Republic
of Vietnam and Israel.

By far the most important costs of FMS are those that
may occur in the future. Sale of the latest and best high
technology weapon systems may wipe out the qualitative edge
enjoyed by the U.S. in most weapon systems. Technology
transfer may make it possible for other countries to make
revolutionary advances which would be detrimental to U.S.
security simply by buying the technology from the U.S. An
ad hoc arms sale policy and an apparent willingness to sell
arms may encourage arms races which, because end use control
is not foolproof, may result in conflicts in which the U.S.
becomes involved. U.S. defense industries may become so
dependent on foreign orders that they encourage more and
more sales with less and less control. Abuses of the inter-
national logistics support programs by customer countries
could result in decreased readiness for U.S. Forces.
All of the above listed costs would have serious impact
on U.S. military forces and U.S. foreign relations and could
result in great loss of treasure and life for the U.S. The
critical point is that all these costs may happen. They
are possibilities or perhaps even probable results of current
actions but they have not yet occurred.
What has occurred as a result of FMS is that the average
sales for the last four years has been about $8 billion per
year which helps to offset growing imports. U.S. military
sales exports have kept pace with the increasing oil import
payments to Persian Gulf States and have provided many thou-
sands of jobs for defense industry workers. Defense industries
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have been helped and in at least one case saved from bank-
ruptcy because of foreign military sales. The defense indus-
trial base, an important national resource, has been main-
tained better than it would have been without FMS and the
Government has collected additional tax receipts because of
these sales. The Defense Department has realized savings
resulting from sales that lowered per unit weapon costs and
sales have been used as a bargaining chip for base and over-
flight rights. Western military capability is being enhanced
by developing more capable friendly forces as a result of
military equipment sales. Access to oil in the Middle East
appears to be assured considering the military dependence
of Iran and Saudi Arabia on the U.S. FMS made it easier for
the U.S. to assist Iran and Saudi Arabia to become strong
enough to fill the power vacuum in the Middle East left by
British withdrawal thereby adding greatly to stabilizing
the area.
Foreign military sales also help the U.S. to gain influ-
ence, counter the Soviets and develop friendly ties. Nowhere
is this more evident than in the Middle East where most of
the military sales are made. These benefits are not only
presently enjoyed but can also be considered as future bene-
fits in that they last for long periods of time. Other fu-
ture benefits that FMS assist in achieving are the long
sought goal of equipment standardization among Western allies
and availability of forward logistic support bases because
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and future) and the benefits (present and future) of FMS
in matrix form.
The "here and now" advantages of FMS are relatively
easily recognized. It is not difficult to look at the
financial reports of a defense contractor and determine the
effect of FMS on his profit statement. In many cases the
effect is the difference in operating at a profit versus
a loss; Grumman is a case in point. In a period of economic
difficulty the benefit of keeping defense industry employees
working in order not to further swell the unemployed rolls
is a benefit that can be appreciated every time government
reports on unemployment are published. Likewise, in a
period when the nation seems to be declining in power and
prestige relative to its competitors, the wisdom of making
sweeping changes to a program that appears to provide more
influence and prestige is questionable.
For these reasons, the FMS program appears to be bene-
ficial to the nation. Nevertheless, it is the opinion of
the authors that should the costs of FMS outlined in Chapter
II become reality, the FMS program would then become an
overall detriment to the United States.
The likelihood of this happening depends on the success
of efforts to increase controls over the FMS program. Recent
interest in and awareness of the problems connected with
the program have led Congress to pass legislation expanding
their role in the FMS review process. This action was viewed
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by Congress as a means of checking the apparent uncontrolled
growth of the program during the early 1970* s.
The 1974 amendment to the Foreign Military Sales Act
requires the Executive Branch to submit to Congress all
proposals to sell military articles or services exceeding
$25,000,000. Congress may reject the proposal within thirty
calendar days by passage of a concurrent resolution unless
the President states that an emergency exists and that the
sale is in the national security interest of the United
States. The Arms Export Control Act of 1976 includes a
provision requiring that all proposals to sell major defense
equipment exceeding $7,000,000 on a government-to-government
basis must be reported in advance to Congress. This act
also requires the President to submit to Congress an annual
country-by-country justification for the government-to-
government military sales program which sets forth:
(1) An estimate of the amount of sales to be
made to each country, including a detailed
explanation of the foreign policy and national
security considerations involved in sales to
each country;
(2) An estimate of the amounts of credits
and guarantees expected to be extended to
each country;
(3) A list of all findings which are in effect
on the date of such transmission made by the
President relating to eligibility, together
with a full and complete justification for each
such finding, explaining how sales to each
country with respect to which that finding has
been made will strengthen the security of the
United States and promote world peace;
99

(4) An arms control impact statement for
each country including (a) an analysis of
the relationship between expected sales to
each country and arms control efforts
relating to that country, and (b) the
impact of the expected sales on the
stability of the region that includes the
purchasing country. *18
Although the above legislation has enlarged the role played
by Congress in the process of reviewing and approving FMS
transactions, the Executive Branch still holds the key
decision-making role in the FMS program. This fact was
evident in September 19 76 when the Ford Administration
submitted formal proposals to Congress to sell almost
$6 billion worth of arms and related equipment and services
119to ten countries
.
These proposals included $4.5 billion in sales to Iran
primarily for the F-16 jet fighter, $701.6 million to Saudi
Arabia, $241.4 million to Israel, and $79.5 million to
Pakistan. With no advanced notification and only 30 days
within which it could reject any of the long list of orders,
Congress did not have time to adequately scrutinize the
proposed sales and was forced to rely on Executive Branch
120
analysis of the proposals. This example illustrates that
118 International Security Assistance^ and Arms Export
Control Act of 1976-1977 . Report of the Committee on Foreign
Relations, United States Senate. 14 May 1976.
"Arms Sales Plan Sent to Congress," Baltimore Sun ,
2 Sep 1976, p. 13.
12 Congress did carefully examine several proposed sales
to Saudi Arabia resulting in a reduction of approved
quantities from 1500 to 650 for Maverick Missiles and from
2000 to 850 for Sidewinder missiles.
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even though Congress has passed legislation to expand its
involvement in the FMS program, the Executive Branch has
retained a dominant position in the decision-making process.
Therefore, any effort to increase controls over the FMS
program must focus primarily on the Executive Branch.
Within the Executive Branch, control of the FMS program
has suffered from a lack of advanced planning. The State
Department currently reviews FMS transactions on a case-by-
case basis as they are received from foreign governments.
Even though each proposed sale is assessed by using the
rigorous set of criteria outlined in Chapter III, there is
no overall analysis of arms exports that takes into account
all pertinent factors (military, economic, and political)
either viewed from a regional or global perspective.
Moreover, the State Department has no formal procedures for
evaluating current FMS transactions in the light of potential
future sales to both the country in question or its neighbors
In effect, decisions on arms sales are made in isolation
without the benefit of a planning mechanism which can provide
both a current and long-range in-depth look at military
exports from an aggregate standpoint.
The State Department has experimented with a global
planning system concept called Policy Analysis and Resource
121
Allocation (PARA) . The PARA was devised as a methodology
William J. Silvey, Policymaking for Foreign Affairs
A General Model , Master's Thesis, Monterey, California:
Naval Postgraduate School, 1972, p. 23.

to improve and clarify policy formulation and to incorporate
the whole foreign affairs community into a related resource
allocation system. Each regional bureau in the State
Department has proceeded to develop its own planning model
to provide input for the PARA system with no departmental
entity being charged with developing a global theory or
structure for policy making. In addition, there has been a
great deal of institutional resistance to PARA because of
concerns that it would limit policy flexibility.
The Bureau of Inter-American Affairs has developed the
most comprehensive planning model for input to the PARA
122
system. This is the Country Analysis Strategy Paper (CASP)
.
However, CASP has suffered from two major drawbacks. First,
the CASP system plans for only a two year period which is
an insufficient timeframe for providing long-range data for
decision-making. Second, no attempt is made to review and
update the CASP once the planning cycle is complete. The
result is a document that is produced at great expense in
manpower, but seldom consulted and not considered binding
for decision-making.
The apparent lack of success of the PARA concept has
severely limited the State Department's ability to analyze
FMS decisions within a global perspective and conduct long-
range planning for arms sales. This may indicate that it
122 Ibid., p. 46.
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would be beneficial for the State Department to coordinate
with an on-going planning system within another Executive
Department. The most obvious choice would be the Planning,
Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) used by the
Department of Defense with which State is already involved
and familiar.
The PPBS is the major planning and budgeting tool of
the DOD. Its primary purpose is for U.S. Force long-range
planning and budgeting. It also includes Allied and Friendly
Force data in a Security Assistance PPBS which is a part of
the overall Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System.
An important element of the Security Assistance PPBS is the
Military Security Assistance Projection (MSAP) in which
grant aid, FMS credit sales, and FMS cash sales are projected
for a five year period and analyzed on a regional and global
basis. FMS cash sale data was included in the system in
1976 but is currently used only to assist in making budget
decisions for grant aid and FMS credit sales. However, it
appears the Security Assistance Projection could be used in
making FMS cash sale decisions as well.
The following chapter will outline the Security
Assistance PPBS and discuss how the system might be modified
for better FMS cash sale decision-making.
103

V. FMS PLANNING: A COORDINATED APPROACH
A. SECURITY ASSISTANCE PPBS
The Security Assistance PPBS cycle spans the approxi-
mate 28-month period of time necessary to develop guidance,
to plan responsive programs for the current planning period,
and to obtain authorization and appropriations for the first
year of the planning period. Figure 5 is a flow-chart of
the key events in the planning cycle.
MAP and FMS procurements generally begin with the host
country interacting with the U.S. diplomatic mission or
MAAG. Fundamental responsibility for decisions relating to
the level and nature of the defense effort and the alloca-
tion of resources rests with the host government. Thus,
to the extent practical, within applicable guidelines and
consistent with U.S. responsibility for controlling its own
resources, development and justification of U.S. security
assistance plans and programs are functions of the host
government. The essential role of the MAAG is to assist the
host government in making its decisions, dissuading it from
those that constitute an unwise allocation of resources or
that otherwise do not contribute effectively to the achieve-
ment of U.S. objectives.
From May through October the MAAG, in coordination with
the host country and the unified commands (CINCs) , acting
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and the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) , develops a detailed
recommendation for the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan
(JSOP)
,
Volume II, Book III, Allied and Friendly Forces.
In December, the JCS issues this document which provides
an estimate of Allied and Friendly Countries major objec-
tive force levels for the mid-range period in support of
U.S. national security objectives and serves as the basis
for establishment of the U.S. military position on military
security assistance. State and DOD generally agree at this
time on the national security objectives and fiscal con-
straints (dollar limits) for MAP and FMS credits on a
country by country basis. These decisions are passed back
to the CINCs/MAAGs for updating and reprogramming action.
In January the CINCs/MAAGs submit the necessary inputs
for the Joint Forces Memorandum (JFM) and the MSAP. This
input is based on the latest policy, planning and programming
guidance and is reflected in a recommended update to the
MSAP which is transmitted to JCS and OSD/ISA. Concurrently,
detailed program data supporting the budget year is provided
to DSAA.
The MSAP is prepared by OSD/ISA considering the JFM
and the MAAG/CINC recommendations for the updated MSAP.
It specifies objectives for military security assistance,
grant material aid, grant foreign military training, FMS
cash and credit sales, U.S. commercial sales, and non-U. S.
sales to country/region. It also recommends the total
109

resource requirements within the parameters of guidance
provided by the SECDEF. The MSAP is forwarded to the SECDEF
and information copies are provided to the JCS, CINCs
,
Military Departments, MAAGs, and to selected agencies in
the executive branch outside DOD to advise of program levels.
The Military Departments reflect the net effect of military
security assistance on their manpower and production base
requirements in their service Program Objective Memorandum
(POMs)
.
As a result of the MSAP review within DOD, issue papers
are circulated for comment to the JCS, Services, and CINCs
before being submitted for decision to the SECDEF. In
addition, fiscal constraints or objectives may become issues
between State and DOD. The Security Assistance Program
Review Committee (SAPRC) normally handles such issues, but
if the issue is of sufficient gravity, the Secretaries of
State, Defense, Treasury, the National Security Council
(NSC) , or the President may become involved. However,
issues are normally settled at a lower level. Program
Decision Memorandums (PDMs) are issued by SECEEF based upon
issue resolution.
A security assistance review for the budget year and
one out-year takes place at the agency level in September
and concludes with a review by SAPRC. The State Department
then develops a security assistance budget, including dollar
levels by country and type of assistance, for submission




By this process, the budget submitted by the President
to Congress in January contains requests for money to fund
the MAP and FMS credit programs for the next fiscal year.
State and DSAA defend the military security assistance por-
tion of the budget before Congress. After the legislative
process result in budget authorizations, MAP programs are
initiated through the appropriate Military Department's
supply and/or procurement process.
FMS credits take a different route once Congress has
completed action on the Budget (See Figure 6) . DSAA obtains
interagency approvals and then notifies the recipient coun-
try and makes a formal agreement on direct credit purchases.
Once approved, the recipient country may then initiate a
request for a Letter of Offer (LOA) . After review of the
request, DSAA directs the appropriate Military Department
to prepare the LOA and to provide DSAA with all supporting
data. LOAs exceeding $25 million must be submitted to Con-
gress for approval, otherwise, they are forwarded directly
to the recipient country for acceptance.
B. A NEW APPROACH
The Security Assistance PPBS could, with minor modifi-
cations, be used by the Executive Branch as a planning
mechanism for FMS cash sales. There are several points of
coordination in the present system between State and DOD
which could be expanded to include deliberations on FMS cash


























































































a five year forecast of FMS cash sales by country and region
which could be used as the data base for an aggregate analy-
sis of FMS cash sales. Therefore, the Security Assistance
PPBS already contains the basic components necessary for
providing decision-makers with better information on which
to base their decisions on FMS cash sales. All that is
needed is an earlier introduction of the cash sale data
into the system, better coordination, and stronger inter-
face points between State and DOD.
Planned FMS cash purchase data should be introduced
into the PPBS cycle when the CINCs/MAAGs forward FMS credit
requests to DSAA and State (Figure 5, Step 1) . This should
be done in close cooperation with the officials of the
123Country Team. Inclusion of FMS cash requests at this
time would give DSAA and particularly State an opportunity
to look at a total security assistance package early in
the planning cycle.
The initial State Department review of FMS cash/credit
applications (Figure 5, Step 2) would be based on general
guidelines which could sort out those requests that are
obviously unacceptable. The guidelines could include
questions such as:
1. Is this sale consistent with foreign policy interests
of the United States?
The Country Team is composed of the Ambassador, his
Advisors, Attaches, other agency representatives, and the
Chief of the MAAG or Missions.

2. Will this sale have negative impact on the social
and economic development of the country?
3. Are there any restrictions on the sale of particular
weapon systems to this country?
4. Does this sale facilitate the common defense?
5. Does the proposed weapon sale violate technology
transfer restrictions?
FMS cash/credit applications which are acceptable would
be forwarded to DSAA for adjustments (Figure 5, Step 3)
for later input into the development of the JSOP Vol. II,
Book III (Figure 5, Step 6) . The inclusion of FMS cash
sale data into the JSOP would enable the JCS to develop
a military position on FMS cash- sales as well as MAP aid
and FMS credit sales.
The State Department would also conduct a detailed coun-
try and regional review of those FMS cash/credit applications
which passed the initial screening. This detailed review
would be in preparation for the State/DOD meeting to obtain
joint agreement on objectives and fiscal constraints for
the Security Assistance Program (Figure 5, Step 10) . Since
DOD would provide the military analysis of proposed FMS
cash/credit sales, the State Department review should
focus on economic and political implications of the sale.
The economic and political criteria presented in Chapter III
would be appropriate for this review. The review should
not only apply the criteria to sales in individual countries,
but should take into consideration the regional perspective
as well.

At the State/DOD meeting (Figure 5, Step 10) , in addi-
tion to establishing fiscal constraints for MAP and FMS
credits, a joint agreement could be reached on the level
of FMS cash sales by country and region. This agreement
would be based on a joint analysis of the economic and
political review by State and the military review by DOD
of FMS cash sale proposals. The agreement on the level of
FMS cash sales would then be sent along with the fiscal
constraints for MAP and FMS credits to the CINCs/MAAGs for
developing inputs to update the MSAP (Figure 5, Step 11).
Updates to the MSAP are currently prepared by the CINCs/
MAAGs in coordination with State officials on the country
team. However, in the present use of the MSAP, projections
for FMS cash sales are used only as supporting data for
making budget decisions on MAP and FMS credits and there-
fore, are less likely to be scrutinized carefully by the
country team. With FMS cash sales being given equal status
with MAP and FMS credits in the new system, it would be
necessary for the country team to work more closely with
the CINCs/MAAGs in developing FMS cash sale projections.
The MSAP is presently developed by OSD/ISA with inputs
from the JFM and recommended updates from the CINCs/MAAGs
(Figure 5, Step 15) . Involvement of the State Department
in the MSAP preparation would be appropriate if FMS cash
sales are included in the Security Assistance PPBS process.
State Department liaison with OSD/ISA would provide them
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with the opportunity to incorporate guidance from the
Secretary of State on FMS cash sales.
In the present Security Assistance PPBS, the MSAP is
primarily used by DOD to develop recommended program levels
for MAP and FMS credits which are reflected in Program
Decision Memoranda (PDM) issued by the Secretary of Defense
(Figure 5, Step 18) . At this point in the PPBS cycle the
Secretary of State could also use the MSAP to formalize
program decisions for FMS cash sales. The previous agree-
ment on the level of FMS cash sales by country and region
would be critically reviewed in light of updated data in
the MSAP for the current year and the five year security
assistance projection. By considering proposed future FMS
cash sales, the State Department would be a better position
to answer questions on current proposals such as:




Is the recipient country capable of absorbing and
using the arms effectively?
3. Will the sale strain the country's ability to manage
its debt obligation or entail operations and maintenance
costs that might make excessive demands on future budgets?
4. Will the sale set a precedent which could lead to
further requests for arms or for similar requests from
other countries?
Program decisions made by the Secretary of State on FMS
cash sales would be included in the interagency security
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assistance program review (Figure 5, Step 21). Presently,
at the conclusion of this review, the State Department
prepares a security assistance budget for submission to
OMB (Figure 5, Step 22). FMS cash sales could be included
in this budget in the form of recommended levels by country
and region for the upcoming fiscal year.
The Presidential Budget Decision (PBD) would approve the
overall security assistance program and include an approved
dollar level for FMS cash sales for the fiscal year. The
Congressional Presentation Document (CPD) for security
assistance would contain a recommended level for FMS cash
sales and detailed supporting documentation for FMS cash
sales in addition to what is normally provided for MAP and
FMS credit sales (Figure 5, Step 25) . Finally, State and
DSAA would defend the entire security assistance program,
including FMS cash sales, at the Congressional Hearings
(Figure 5, Step 26)
.
By this process, the Congress would be able to set a
yearly ceiling on FMS cash sales. This would not only
increase Congressional control over the FMS program, but
it would also reinforce Executive Branch planning for FMS
cash sales. An effort was made to include a provision in
the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 which would set a
ceiling on FMS cash sales, however, it was deleted due to
strong Executive Branch objections. If the Executive Branch
developed a recommended FMS ceiling by way of the Security
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Assistance PPBS and Congress approved it with minor modi-
fications as is usual then, it is reasonable to assume that
the Executive Branch objections to a ceiling would be
eliminated.
After Congress has voted a ceiling on FMS cash sales,
the State Department in cooperation with DOD and SAPRC
would adjust the FMS program to coincide with the ceiling
authorized (Figure 5, Step 29) . FMS cash sale requests
could then follow the same path currently taken by FMS
credit sales (Figure 6) , except that the steps involving
interest rates and crdit method would be by-passed.
C. IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS
A key factor in implementing a Security Assistance PPBS
which includes FMS cash sales will be the ability of foreign
governments, particularly lesser developed countries (LDCs)
,
to develop rational, long-range planning systems for pro-
viding inputs to the PPBS process. In many LDCs this is a
totally alien concept. In fact, as discussed in Chapter
Four, even the U.S. State Department has had difficulties
in developing a planning mechanism. Consequently, the U.S.
would have to provide a great deal of assistance to LDCs
in developing planning systems and training personnel in
their proper use. In the interim, the country teams would
have to work very closely with foreign governments to





Another drawback would be a possible lack of coop-
eration from foreign governments in working with the U.S.
to develop long-range plans for weapon procurements. Po-
tential customers might view this as unnecessary outside
interference in their internal affairs and opt to take
their business elsewhere. In addition, governments which
pay cash have no apparent motivation to participate in the
PPBS since they are not receiving aid or credit and, there-
fore, would probably find it less burdensome administra-
tively to buy from another supplier. Finally, governments
might not be willing to accept additional delays in receiving
arms that would result from a long-range planning system.
There are several reasons FMS customers might find it
advantageous to cooperate with the U.S. in planning arms
purchases well in advance of actual requirements. The most
compelling reason is that U.S. weapons are in high demand
throughout the world. In testimony before Congress, Philip
C. Habib, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs
stated:
"Our arms industry — like agriculture and
our other advanced technology industries —
happens to be the best in the world. We
not only manufacture the best planes, ships,
and other systems; we provide better train-
ing and more reliable logistic support. We
do not seek to force arms sales on others.
Our products are sought by modernizing
States. "124
"Department Testifies On Proposed Military Sales
To Foreign Governments," The Department Of State Bulletin ,
Vol. LXXV, No. 1946, 11 October 1976, p. 450.
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Another incentive to participate would be that countries
could find out much earlier the amount and types of weapons
the U.S. would be willing to sell, thereby reducing many
uncertainties in their force structure planning.
The planning cycle of PPBS might also assist customer
countries to more rationally and systematically approach
decisions on defense expenditures. For instance, Iran,
one of the world's largest arms purchaser, is finding it
increasingly difficult to pay for its growing military
establishment due to declining oil revenues. By partici-
pating in the PPBS planning process, Iran would have a
better tool to help make long-range budgeting decisions
in order to more effectively allocate their resources.
In addition to external problems resulting from inte-
grating foreign governments into the system, there might
be several internal Executive Branch problems as well.
The question of agency perogatives of both State and DOD
could easily become a major stumbling block without close
cooperation and open communications between the two depart-
ments. Also, State Department personnel might oppose the
system for fear of losing flexibility as they did with their
own PARA system. Finally, increased resources necessary
to implement the system, particularly manpower, could prove
to be a problem.
Congress may also experience some difficulty in dealing
with an integrated "big picture" approach to security
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assistance planning. Despite statements made by various
Congressmen that the Executive Branch needs to develop an
integrated long-range procedure for dealing with foreign
military sales, the Congress itself appears to feel more
comfortable and secure dealing with sales on a case-by-case
basis. This allows considering one transaction without
being overly concerned with what the result will be in ten
years and allows decisions to be made to maximize short-
term benefits for the Congressman or his constituents.
Since the new approach to security assistance planning
would provide a long-range integrated plan for security
assistance, it would require more analysis and study by
Congress and would lessen the ability of Congressmen to
pick and choose those specific sales felt to be in their
interests. In short, in order to make the system work
the Congress would have to become much more programmatic
in its approach to FMS and be less concerned with short-
term return to themselves. This would be a difficult, but
not impossible task, for a Congress whose constituents are
interested, in many cases, only in, "What have you done for
me today?"
However, the advantage of the system in supplying both
aggregate and long-range data for FMS decision-making
should be a sufficient reward for overcoming these problems
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